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ABSTRACT 
There has been a trend among feminists and family law scholars to-
ward privatization. The idea is that private agreements can take the 
place of public marriage contracts. Private agreements can determine 
property disposition, confer the right to make medical decisions, and, 
potentially at least, also confer parental status on a nonbiological par-
ent. But the scholarly trend does not fully address how courts treat pri-
vate family agreements when children are involved. In short, family 
courts do not enforce contracts regarding children. Biology and adop-
tion tend to be the only way to achieve parentage. In custody and visita-
tion proceedings, courts follow the “best-interests-of-the-child” doctrine 
to determine who should play the part of parent, regardless of contrary 
parental intent. This Article describes the conflict between the scholarly 
trend toward privatization and the family court reality. The Article 
then argues that properly drafted parenting agreements should be en-
forced by family courts, both in determining parental status and in de-
termining custody. In other words, custody courts should not be al-
lowed to disregard parenting agreements in the course of an ad hoc 
best-interests analysis. Parents—biological, adoptive, and contrac-
tual—should be on the same footing in the best-interests evaluation. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 M. and J.A.1 dealt with an increasingly common problem when 
they decided to have a baby. Because they are both women, their 
marriage is not recognized by the state where they live. Therefore, 
the child of one is not automatically recognized as the child of the 
other. They went ahead with artificial insemination anyway, using 
sperm from an anonymous donor so the “father’s” parental rights 
would not be an issue, and in October 2006, J.A. gave birth to a boy.  
 “We thought a lot about the law when we were considering using a 
known donor,” says J.A. “[T]here are many legal issues that can come 
into play when you are asking someone to give up their parental 
rights. We’ve heard some of the horror stories about donors (or their 
family members) later fighting for custody and winning. We are 
happy that we won’t have to deal with those types of issues.” Still, 
there will be issues. “Mostly we want to figure out how/if we can do a 
[second-]parent adoption,” J.A. says.2 M. and J.A. know of one family 
law judge in their state who performs second-parent adoptions for 
gay couples. That state is not named here, because M. and J.A. fear 
that if this judge draws attention for performing such adoptions, the 
state legislature may react by banning the practice. “If we can’t do 
the [second-]parent adoption, what type of documents do we need to 
put in place to assure [M.] custody and other parental rights?”  
 The answer to this question is unclear. There has been a trend in 
family law toward privatization, and some scholars argue that pri-
vate family agreements can take the place of the marriage contract 
 
 1. M. and J.A. shared their story via e-mail. See E-mail from M. and J.A. to author 
(Mar. 7, 2005, 16:25:35 CST) (on file with author). Initials are used to preserve anonymity.  
 2. “Second-parent adoption” refers to the procedure whereby the spouse or partner of 
a biological parent adopts the child of that parent without terminating the biological par-
ent’s parental rights. After the adoption, both parents have equal parenting rights in the 
child. Second-parent adoption is distinguished from traditional adoption in that the latter 
requires the biological parent to give up all parental rights. See infra Part II.D. 
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in providing parenting rights and responsibilities.3 Such contracts 
may become even more prevalent as constitutional amendments 
banning gay marriage are passed throughout the country.4 But estab-
lishing parental status is only the first half of the equation. When 
that status really matters—in a custody dispute, for example—family 
courts may implicitly disregard parental status in determining the 
best interests of the child. Moreover, even establishing parental 
status in the first place is a large hurdle because under most state 
statutes, parentage is largely a function of biology.5 Even if a family 
law court nominally enforces a contract establishing status, the court 
may find that its own ad hoc assessment of the child’s best interests 
trumps the parents’ agreement. In other words, any contract regard-
ing parental status between same-sex parents is unlikely to be en-
forced because of these twin obstacles: (1) the statutory requirements 
for establishing parental status and (2) the best-interests analysis.  
 The best-interests doctrine, and family law generally, is suffused 
with notions of conscience and equity not present in traditional con-
tract cases. Family law does not respect the traditional rules of con-
tract. Thus, principles protecting expectations and reliance do not 
apply in the family law setting. Though well-intentioned, family 
courts may place unwarranted obstacles between parents who have 
tried to create rights via contract and their children. This issue is not 
limited to gay parents, but it is particularly pertinent to them be-
cause often one gay parent is not biologically related to the child. 
Unmarried heterosexual parents, though they face similar obstacles 
to establishing parental status, are generally helped by being able to 
point to a biological relationship with the child. More broadly, the 
conflict between contract and family law highlighted here reveals 
that all parents—even married heterosexuals—may face limits in at-
tempting to modify their rights and responsibilities to their children.  
 This Article addresses the limits family law puts on parents and 
children, as exemplified by the conflict between contract doctrine and 
the best-interests doctrine. In particular, family law limits who may 
be a parent, both in status and in practice. The conflict is starkest 
 
 3. See infra note 9. 
 4. As many as “45 states have approved constitutional amendments or statutes to 
define traditional marriage in a way that would bar same-sex marriage.” Shailagh Murray, 
Gay Marriage Amendment Fails in Senate, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A01. Some of 
these laws may also ban contracts designed to establish rights similar to those established 
by marriage. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2004) (banning any “civil union, partnership 
contract or other arrangement between persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the 
privileges or obligations of marriage”). Laws like the one in Virginia notwithstanding, it 
seems likely that gay couples increasingly will turn to private agreements to try to create 
permanent, formal family rights for themselves and their children. 
 5. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1 (1973) (defining “parent and child relation-
ship” as including only “the legal relationship . . . between a child and his natural or 
adoptive parents”).   
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where a nonbiological, same-sex parent6 seeks custody of a child. 
First, that parent’s status might not be recognized if it is established 
by contract. Second, even if parental status is recognized, family 
courts may still grant custody to the biological parent, implicitly 
or explicitly determining that to do so is in the child’s best inter-
ests, notwithstanding agreements between the parents manifest-
ing a contrary intent.  
 This Article proposes a two-part solution to this problem. First, 
courts should recognize contracts between unmarried parents estab-
lishing parental status. Second, such contracts should receive consid-
eration in any subsequent best-interests analysis. In other words, 
courts should not use the open-ended nature of the best-interests 
analysis to undo the rights and responsibilities the parents have es-
tablished by contract. States have a compelling interest in the wel-
fare of their children and are therefore unlikely to take a hands-off 
approach to these cases; they should at least treat unmarried parents 
with a valid parenting agreement—contractual parents—the same 
way they treat married parents or adoptive parents. Contractual par-
ents should enter the best-interests evaluation on equal footing. In 
practice, this approach would require family courts to defer to parent-
ing contracts in the course of determining a child’s best interests. 
 To be clear, the parenting contract contemplated by this Article 
would establish merely parental status. It would not address custody 
or visitation rights. A large part of this Article’s project is to separate 
the issue of status from the issue of custody and visitation. The law 
treats these issues separately, but courts often conflate them. Par-
enting status tends to be governed by biology (one aspect of the law 
that this Article argues for changing) or by establishment of a legal 
parenting relationship with the child (usually by adoption). Custody 
and visitation are governed by best-interests analysis. As discussed be-
low, both types of analysis disadvantage gay, nonbiological parents.7  
 The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the trend of 
privatization in family law. What is called “privatization” here could 
also be conceptualized as the state’s loosening of the reins on the evo-
lution of family relationships. This Part covers the shift from legal 
 
 6. The same-sex partner of a biological parent is referred to here as the “nonbiologi-
cal parent,” although using the term “parent” assumes one of the points in question. This is 
intentional. These partners are parents inasmuch as they intend, with the biological par-
ent, to bring a child into the world or at least to rear that child. Some courts have referred 
to these partners as “functional parents,” “psychological parents,” or “de facto parents” be-
cause they fulfill the role of parent despite their lack of a biological or legal connection. The 
term used here is similar, but “nonbiological parent” or “same-sex parent” is more specific.   
 7. Adoption law reveals how the issues can become intertwined. Adoption is princi-
pally about establishing parental status in the adoptive parent, but (inasmuch as adoptive 
parents often have no biological connection to the child) the law requires that any adoption 
be in the child’s best interests. See infra Part II.D. 
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recognition of only traditional heterosexual families to the allowance 
of private modifications to marriage contracts (notably including 
premarital agreements and surrogacy agreements) and, ultimately, 
to the limited recognition of so-called alternative family arrange-
ments. Part II discusses the best-interests-of-the-child doctrine and 
its use today as an ad hoc method of resolving family disputes that 
may deny same-sex parents of rights they have attempted to create 
by contract. This Part concludes with a discussion of the law sur-
rounding second-parent adoption, which, though not universally 
available, is the only sure method of securing parental rights for 
same-sex, nonbiological parents. Part III proposes a new approach: 
enforcement of parenting agreements so that “contractual parents” 
would be treated the same as married, biological, or adoptive parents 
in a best-interests analysis. The parenting agreement would elimi-
nate the priority often given to the biological parent so that both par-
ents have an equal shot at custody as well as equal rights and re-
sponsibilities to the child outside the courtroom.8  
II.   THE PRIVATIZATION OF FAMILY LAW 
 This Part discusses the shift from state-defined, one-size-fits-all 
legal families to state acceptance of limited, private modifications to 
those legal relationships. Scholars have argued that the logical con-
clusion of this shift is widespread use of contract to establish pri-
vately what cannot be established publicly, including parental 
rights.9 There is a debate over whether marriage rights should be the 
ultimate goal for same-sex couples, but that debate is beyond the 
scope of this Article.10 However, it is worth considering that the move 
 
 8. For example, the nonbiological parent would also be on equal footing with the bio-
logical parent in making medical decisions for the child. Courts struggle with cases of pa-
rental disagreement even where parents are on equal footing, suggesting that where there 
is an opportunity to prefer one parent (biological) over the other (nonbiological), courts will 
take it. See generally In re K.I., 735 A.2d 448, 453–56 (D.C. 1999) (holding that, where the 
mother had been deemed neglectful and the parents disagreed about medical treatment, 
the court had the power to implement a do-not-resuscitate order against the mother’s 
wishes because it was found to be in the child’s best interests).   
 9. See generally, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and 
Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 (2004) 
(arguing that the law should abandon its interest in determining biological paternity and 
concentrate instead on contracts for paternity); Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Mar-
riage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 48–49 (1996) (arguing that contracts regarding child-
rearing, support, and custody ought to be enforced, so long as they are negotiated with the 
child’s best interests in mind); Jill Schachner Chanen, The Changing Face of Gay Legal Is-
sues, A.B.A. J., July 2004, at 46, 49–50 (advising on the importance of having contracts de-
tailing family agreements but also pointing out that second-parent adoption is the best 
way to ensure rights regarding children).  
 10. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL 
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 60–61 (1996) (describing the debate among gay rights 
and feminist advocates about whether gay marriage is worth the fight). 
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toward contract may be as much normative as it is strategic. Many 
same-sex couples would not marry if they could because they believe 
marriage is a hierarchical, sexist arrangement between a dominant 
man and a submissive woman.11 For them, contract offers a more 
egalitarian model where both parties are presumed to be on equal 
footing for bargaining purposes.12 On the other hand, the use of con-
tract may be simply strategic for couples trying to create the rights 
that exist between formally married couples. 
 This Part begins with a refresher in the basics of contract doc-
trine, both to orient the reader and to highlight the contrast between 
the objective nature of contract theory and the subjective, norms-
laden realm of family law. 
A.   Contract Basics 
 Courts ordinarily enforce contracts between two parties where 
there has been an offer, acceptance, and consideration.13 Courts tend 
not to look closely at the nature of the consideration. So long as the 
parties know what they are bargaining for and their bargaining 
power is not so unequal that the contract is unconscionable, courts 
generally take a hands-off approach and enforce the contract.14 
Courts enforce the contract terms that are objectively manifest. They 
do not look for the subjective intentions of the parties at the time 
they entered the agreement.15 The theory behind these principles is 
that private parties should be allowed to order their conduct pri-
vately and that courts should enforce the agreements they make 
without passing judgment on those agreements, so long as they are 
not illegal or in violation of public policy.16 Where a contract is not il-
 
 11. See id. 
 12. See supra note 9. 
 13. “A contract by ancient definition, is ‘an agreement between competent parties, 
upon a consideration sufficient in law, to do or not do a particular thing.’ ” Steinberg v. 
Chicago Med. Sch., 371 N.E.2d 634, 639 (Ill. 1977) (quoting People v. Dummer, 113 N.E. 
934, 935 (Ill. 1916)). “An offer, an acceptance . . . , and consideration . . . are basic ingredi-
ents of a contract.” Id. at 639.  
 14. See Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 544–45, 548–51 (1891) (enforcing a contract 
between an uncle and his nephew where the uncle promised to pay the nephew if he gave 
up carousing); see also Dahl v. HEM Pharms. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1404–05 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(discussing Hamer v. Sidway). 
 15. See Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 778–79 (1907) 
(holding that a contract is created if the words used therein would be interpreted as a con-
tract by a reasonable person, regardless of the parties’ subjective intentions); see also 
Townsend v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 196 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co.). 
 16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 (1981) (“A public policy against 
the enforcement of promises or other terms may be derived by the court from (a) legislation 
relevant to such a policy, or (b) the need to protect some aspect of the public welfare . . . .”); 
see also Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 14 N.E.2d 798, 799–800 (N.Y. 1938) 
(concluding that a defense of legal compulsion based on the Nazi laws of Germany, in a 
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legal, courts generally look only for “(1) the existence of a contract, 
(2) performance by the plaintiff, (3) a breach by the defendant, and 
(4) damage or loss to the plaintiff.”17 The remainder of this Part ad-
dresses the contractarian nature of marriage and family and how it 
has changed from a state-defined institution to one defined, at least 
somewhat, by private parties. 
B.   Marriage and Family: Public Institutions 
 It is commonly said that courts will not enforce contracts for sex.18 
However, “[o]ur law considers marriage in no other light than as a 
civil contract.”19 If marriage is a contract, and the state officially con-
dones only marital sex, then marriage is fundamentally a contract 
for sex. Because marriage is a contract, it must be based on a binding 
offer and acceptance.20 No particular words are required to create a 
marriage contract. It is sufficient that both parties agree to the en-
gagement,21 so long as they have the legal capacity to enter the con-
tract22 and it is free from duress or fraud.23  
 Marriage and family are essentially public institutions defined by 
the state. This may seem counterintuitive insofar as the privacy of 
the family has been used for centuries to shield marital rape and 
child abuse from criminal and civil sanctions.24 But families are pub-
                                                                                                                    
suit by a Jew for wrongful discharge by his German employer, does not violate the public 
policy of New York).  
 17. See, e.g., Alpha Telecomms., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 194 F. App’x 385, 389 
(6th Cir. 2006). 
 18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190 (1981) (declaring unenforceable 
any promise to “change some essential incident of the marital relationship”); 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 587 (1932) (“A bargain between married persons or 
persons contemplating marriage to change the essential incidents of marriage is illegal.”); see 
also, e.g., Roush v. Battin, 30 N.W.2d 453, 454 (Wis. 1947) (holding that “illicit cohabitation”—
presumably a euphemism for sex—cannot be consideration for an agreement to marry).
 19. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: REVISED AND ABRIDGED 300 
(Henry Winthrop Ballentine ed., Blackstone Inst., Modern American Law No. 15, 1915). 
 20. See, e.g., Abdallah v. Sarsour, No. CH-2005-2339, 2006 WL 1134034, at *1 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. Mar. 20, 2006) (finding that a marriage contract was not void for lack of considera-
tion where there was an offer to marry and an acceptance). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 
1982) (holding that the state was within its parens patriae power when it determined that 
minors lacked the capacity to marry); see also Lowe v. Quinn, 267 N.E.2d 251 (N.Y. 1971) 
(holding that an agreement to marry is void as against public policy where one of the par-
ties is already married to a third party and that the agreed marriage is not saved “by the 
fact that the married individual contemplated a divorce and that the agreement was condi-
tioned on procurement of the divorce”).
 23. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Marquart, 178 N.W. 428, 428–30 (N.D. 1920) (holding that 
where the defendant breached his promise to marry, he could rebut the claim with proof that 
he had been released from the contract by his fiancée’s agreement to marry another man). 
 24. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 
(1989) (holding that the state does not have an affirmative duty to protect a child from 
harm by his parent, a private individual, even if the state knows of the danger to the child).  
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lic in the sense that they are publicly defined. Traditionally, “family” 
meant a heterosexual married couple and their children. When 
straight couples marry, one set of legal consequences automatically 
attaches to their union.25 They do not have to write their own con-
tract specifying what it means to them to be married or which bur-
dens and benefits they intend to assume. The state has defined mar-
riage for them. The state decides who may marry and how those who 
marry may divorce.26 And, although marriages are infinitely varied, 
everyone understands what it means to be “married” without having 
to inquire, “what sort of marriage are you in?” Married means one 
thing in the eyes of the law.  
1.   What “Married” Means to the State 
 At common law, the husband and wife were one person.27 Mar-
riage subsumed the wife’s identity into that of the husband; he 
owned her property, and only he could represent her in court.28 Mari-
tal rape was not rape, legally speaking,29 and if she left the marriage, 
he retained custody of the children.30 Marriage was a patriarchal 
man-woman dichotomy. This framework was rigid and did not allow 
for alternative arrangements—that is, children born out of wedlock 
 
 25. As one scholar has noted, 
 Perhaps the most significant way the law traditionally regulated intimate 
behavior was by distinguishing sharply, in virtually all important contexts, be-
tween married persons and persons in nonmarital intimate relationships. 
Through laws criminalizing adultery, fornication and nonmarital cohabitation, 
the law carved out marriage as the only legitimate arena for sexual inter-
course. Tort causes of action for enticement, alienation of affections and crimi-
nal conversation penalized third parties who intentionally interfered with the 
marriage relationship; loss of consortium claims protected husbands (and later 
wives) against those who negligently impaired marital relations. No similar 
doctrines protected nonmarital intimate relationships from deliberate or negli-
gent third party impairment. 
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1447 (cita-
tions omitted). 
 26. Marjorie Maguire Shultz (among others) has made this same observation and 
highlighted the irony that “precisely in that zone where exclusion of contractual principles 
is justified on the ground that family life is too ‘private’ for legal intervention, there we im-
pose standardized public content about the expectations and obligations of intimacy.” 
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, The Gendered Curriculum: Of Contracts and Careers, 77 IOWA L. 
REV. 55, 60 (1991). 
 27. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 304. 
 28. See id.; see also Fleming v. Griswold, 3 Hill 85, 85–87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (hold-
ing that a wife’s inability to sue due to coverture did not prevent the statute of limitations 
from running against her).  
 29. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 856 (Found. Press 2001) (explain-
ing that under the marital rape exception “no amount of force and explicitness of noncon-
sent makes particular sex acts into rape”). 
 30. See id. at 554 (noting the rule granting custody only to fathers, which was re-
placed with the presumption that the mother would win custody, which was replaced with 
the best interests doctrine). 
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were denied the benefits of “legitimate” children.31 The wife could not 
be the dominant partner within a marriage, nor could husband and 
wife establish equal roles. Neither wife and wife nor husband and 
husband could fit themselves into the established mold. This latter 
restriction still applies in most states.32
 Today the publicly defined marriage contract is far less rigid and 
also far less sexist. Women are legally independent of their hus-
bands, and the marital rape exception has been largely abolished.33 
Marriage also entails numerous rights and benefits for the couple. 
The following is a representative list, compiled by Professor William 
Eskridge:   
• The right to receive, or the obligation to provide, spousal sup-
port, and (in the event of separation or divorce) alimony and 
an equitable division of property 
• Preference in being appointed the personal representative of an 
intestate decedent . . .  
• Priority in being appointed guardian of an incapacitated 
[spouse] or in being recognized as [making health-care deci-
sions for that spouse] 
• All manner of rights relating to the involuntary hospitalization 
of the spouse, including the right to petition, the right to be 
notified, and the right to initiate proceedings leading to release 
• The right to bring a lawsuit for the wrongful death of the 
spouse and for the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
through harm to one’s spouse 
• The right to spousal benefits statutorily guaranteed to public 
employees, including health and life insurance and disability 
payments, plus similar contractual benefits for private sector 
employees 
• The right to invoke special state protection for “intrafamily of-
fenses” 
• The right to visit one’s spouse on furlough while incarcerated in 
prison 
• The right to claim an evidentiary privilege for marital commu-
nications 
• A presumption of joint ownership of real estate as a tenancy in 
common and a right not to be held to a mortgage or assign-
ment of rights to creditors without the spouse’s written per-
mission 
 
 31. See id. at 577 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF 
ENGLAND 434 (Chicago Press 1979) (1765–69)) (noting that children were “of two sorts, le-
gitimate, and spurious, or bastards”). 
 32. See supra note 4. 
 33. See Mustafa K. Kasubhai, Destabilizing Power in Rape: Why Consent Theory in 
Rape Law Is Turned on Its Head, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 58–59 (2006) (“Today, most ju-
risdictions have either restricted this marital rape exemption or abolished it.”).  
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• A right to priority in claiming human remains and to make 
anatomical donations on behalf of the deceased spouse 
• Various inheritance rights, including priority in inheriting the 
property of an intestate decedent, the right to a family allow-
ance, and the right to dower 
• The right for one’s non-American spouse to qualify as an “im-
mediate relative” (i.e., receive preferential immigration treat-
ment) and become an American citizen under federal law 
• The right to receive additional Social Security benefits based on 
the spouse’s contribution 
• Survivor’s benefits on the death of a veteran spouse34 
It goes without saying that, insofar as gay marriage is illegal in most 
states, these rights are denied to same-sex couples unless they can 
establish them privately through contract.  
2.   The Marital Presumption 
 Marriage also entails the presumption that the husband is the fa-
ther of the wife’s children.35 At common law, and in many states by 
statute, this presumption was irrebutable.36 It persisted despite any 
evidence to the contrary and, in effect, created a contract theory of 
parenthood. If you married a woman, you agreed to be the father of 
her child, even if he did not look like you.37 As with the marriage con-
tract generally, parties were not allowed to alter the terms of the 
marital presumption.38
Traditionally, by agreeing to enter into that status, husband and 
wife were agreeing to support and raise any children born to the 
marriage. Because husband and wife agreed to raise children, they 
were bound to be father and mother, regardless of whether the 
children born to the marriage were biologically related.39
 Genetic testing has chipped away at adherence to the marital pre-
sumption, and courts and legislatures have begun releasing hus-
bands from their parental status where they have established that 
 
 34. ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 66 (footnotes omitted). 
 35. See Goodright v. Moss, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (K.B.) (stating Lord Mans-
field’s Rule presuming that a mother’s husband is the father of all children born to her dur-
ing the marriage).  
 36. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119–21 (1989) (upholding California’s 
“conclusive presumption” that a child born into an intact marriage is the legal child of the 
mother’s husband). 
 37. See id. 
 38. See Baker, supra note 9, at 12 (“[F]or most intents and purposes, the marital pre-
sumption of the husband’s paternity was irrebuttable.”). “Marriage is a contract to be to-
gether and regardless of whether the wife was also ‘together’ with someone else, she is still 
in a unit with the husband.” Id. at 24. 
 39. Id. at 25. 
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they have no genetic link to their wives’ children.40 Still, the assump-
tion that the husband is the father persists in the law.41 The marital 
presumption suggests that parentage is more about functioning as a 
parent than it is about a biological connection to the child. This is 
true at least insofar as being married to a child’s mother suggests the 
intent to share her life and help rear her children. Indeed, some 
courts have begun to recognize the “de facto parent” doctrine, which 
focuses on the fact of acting like a parent rather than on a genetic 
link with a child.42    
 Broadly speaking, the marital presumption and the de facto par-
ent doctrine both rely on the traditional marriage contract to deter-
mine parentage. The former does so explicitly. The latter looks to 
marriage as a model: if the relationship looks like a marriage and the 
parties are rearing a child together, some courts will infer a parental 
relationship. Furthermore, just as the marital contract provides an 
example upon which courts have built the de facto parent doctrine, 
marriage can also provide an example upon which nontraditional 
families can build. But first, they need the right to make changes to 
the traditional variety. 
C.   Modifications to the Marriage Contract 
1.   Premarital Agreements 
 The state-defined marriage contract was inflexible until the early 
1970s, when courts began recognizing both no-fault divorce and pre-
marital agreements determining property disposition upon divorce, 
rather than just upon the death of one spouse.43 These changes gave 
couples some freedom to modify the traditional marriage contract, at 
least as it applied to property and finances. Still, the state maintains 
control over premarital agreements by engaging in some level of sub-
stantive review of their terms instead of taking a hands-off approach 
to enforcement, as a court would do with a commercial contract. The 
American Law Institute (ALI) explains why this is: 
 
 40. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 323, nn.4–5 (2004) (listing cases).  
 41. See Baker, supra note 9, at n.47 (noting that California has codified the common 
law marital presumption and that all states, by statute or common law, have at least a re-
buttable presumption that a husband is the father of his wife’s children).  
 42. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 549–50 (N.J. 2000) (holding that a biologi-
cal mother’s former partner had standing to seek custody as the children’s “psychological 
parent” and listing cases where other courts had recognized such nonbiological parents). 
See generally id. at 542–46 (more thoroughly discussing the de facto parent doctrine). 
 43. See, e.g., Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 111 (W. Va. 1985) (enforcing a premarital 
agreement in which the wife waived alimony even though she was not represented by in-
dependent counsel); see also Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family 
Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 65, 72 (1998) (discussing premarital agreements). See generally 
Singer, supra note 25, at 1470–74 (discussing the development of no-fault divorce in law).  
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 The traditional defenses to enforcement [of premarital contracts] 
are justified by two general limitations to the bargain principle 
that have particular relevance to premarital agreements. First, the 
bargain principle assumes that the parties themselves are the best 
judges of their own self-interest, and thus of whether a bargain’s 
terms are advantageous to them. . . . Second, the law’s willingness 
to enforce a bargain presupposes that it does not contain terms 
that violate other important public policies.44
 As to the first limitation, premarital agreements often involve (1) 
unrealistic optimism about the future of the relationship and (2) the 
tendency to discount the importance of contractual terms that would 
apply only in the event of divorce.45 As to the second limitation, the 
ALI envisions that enforcement of premarital agreements is likely to 
violate public policy in particular situations, for example, where a 
child has been born during the marriage.46 In these situations, the 
ALI recommends that such agreements be reviewed for substantial 
injustice, but only when the party resisting enforcement requests 
such review. Thus, although under the ALI principles such agree-
ments would receive a more searching review than the standard 
commercial contract, there is still room for far more contractual free-
dom than couples enjoyed prior to the acceptance of such agreements. 
The level of review recommended by the ALI for premarital agreements 
provides a preview for how courts review family agreements between 
same-sex couples. There, too, courts engage in substantive review, al-
though for somewhat different reasons and with different results.  
2.   Surrogacy Agreements 
 Surrogacy agreements are controversial, but the law surrounding 
these arrangements offers critical guidance for parties attempting to 
establish parental status by contract, because a surrogacy agreement 
is, in essence, a contract for parental status. If drafted properly, such 
agreements should create enforceable parental status. This subpart 
discusses the law of surrogacy, how it tends to prefer biological par-
ents to nonbiological parents (at least where one biological relation-
 
 44. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05 cmt. a (2002). 
 45. Id. at 986. 
 46. Id. at 985. See also id. at § 7.05(2)(a)–(c), recommending that courts should en-
gage in substantive review of such agreements  
if, and only if, the party resisting its enforcement shows that one or more of the 
following have occurred since the time of the agreement’s execution:  
(a) more than a fixed number of years have passed, that number being set in a 
rule of statewide application;  
(b) a child was born to, or adopted by, the parties, who at the time of execution 
had no children in common;  
(c) there has been a change in circumstances that has a substantial impact on 
the parties or their children, but when they executed the agreement the parties 
probably did not anticipate either the change, or its impact.  
2007]                          PARENTING AGREEMENTS 925 
 
                                                                                                                   
ship clearly exists), and how surrogacy agreements should be 
treated, as well as how they can be used by parents attempting to 
create parental status by contract.  
 According to the Uniform Parentage Act of 2002, approximately 
half of the states have statutory or case law on the legality of surro-
gacy.47 About half of those states recognize such agreements, and the 
other half reject them.48 Two cases described below illustrate the ma-
jor divisions over the issue.49 There are two types of surrogacy. Tra-
ditional surrogacy involves a surrogate woman being inseminated 
with a man’s sperm (generally the male member of the couple that 
intends to become the child’s parents) and then surrendering her 
rights to her genetic child to the intended parents. Traditional surro-
gacy is more controversial than gestational surrogacy, where an em-
bryo (typically created from the egg and sperm of the couple intend-
ing to become parents) is implanted in the surrogate’s womb. In ges-
tational surrogacy, the surrogate is not genetically related to the 
child, but a gestational surrogate still has a parental claim to the 
child and still must surrender her rights to the child before the in-
tended parents may establish parental status and custody. 
 Though the law is unsettled, courts seem more willing to enforce 
gestational surrogacy agreements than traditional surrogacy agree-
ments.50 This seems to be because in gestational surrogacy the sur-
rogate is not surrendering rights to her genetic child. In other words, 
she is not what we think of as a “biological parent,” even though she 
gave birth to the child. This fits with the biological basis for parental 
status that pervades much of family law, but, as discussed below, it 
works unfairness on nonbiological parents and often ignores the bond 
between gestational mother and child.  
 
 47. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8, cmt. (amended 2002). 
 48. See id. 
A survey in December, 2000, revealed a wide variety of approaches: eleven 
states allow gestational agreements by statute or case law; six states void such 
agreements by statute; eight states do not ban agreements per se, but statuto-
rily ban compensation to the gestational mother, which as a practical matter 
limits the likelihood of agreement to close relatives; and two states judicially 
refuse to recognize such agreements. In states rejecting gestational agree-
ments, the legal status of children born pursuant to such an agreement is un-
certain. If gestational agreements are voided or criminalized, individuals de-
termined to become parents through this method will seek a friendlier legal fo-
rum. This raises a host of legal issues. For example, a couple may return to 
their home state with a child born as the consequence of a gestational agree-
ment recognized in another state. This presents a full faith and credit ques-
tion if their home state has a statute declaring gestational agreements to be 
void or criminal.  
Id.; see also J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 12–16 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2004) (discussing the va-
riety in state surrogacy law). 
 49. Compare Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), with In re Baby M.,  537 
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 50. See supra note 48. 
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(a)   Gestational Surrogacy 
 In the California case Johnson v. Calvert,51 a married couple en-
tered a contract with a surrogate to carry their genetic embryo (the 
husband’s sperm and the wife’s egg) in the surrogate’s womb.52 When 
the baby was born, the surrogate, Anna, tried to renege on the deal, 
claiming that she was the “natural” mother. The court found that 
“[b]ecause two women each have presented acceptable proof of ma-
ternity, we do not believe this case can be decided without enquiring 
into the parties’ intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agree-
ment.”53 Based on those intentions, the court held that the genetic 
parents were to have custody of the child.54
[The husband and wife] affirmatively intended the birth of the 
child, and took the steps necessary to effect in vitro fertilization. 
But for their acted-on intention, the child would not exist. Anna 
agreed to facilitate the procreation of Mark’s and Crispina’s child. 
The parties’ aim was to bring Mark’s and Crispina’s child into the 
world, not for Mark and Crispina to donate a zygote to Anna. 
Crispina from the outset intended to be the child’s mother. Al-
though the gestative function Anna performed was necessary to 
bring about the child’s birth, it is safe to say that Anna would not 
have been given the opportunity to gestate or deliver the child had 
she, prior to implantation of the zygote, manifested her own intent 
to be the child’s mother. No reason appears why Anna’s later 
change of heart should vitiate the determination that Crispina is 
the child’s natural mother.55
 Of course, one reason does appear, which explains why Anna’s 
later change of heart might vitiate the determination that Crispina is 
the child’s “natural mother”: Anna carried the child to term. But in-
stead of addressing whether the gestational mother’s claim might be 
superior to the genetic mother’s, the court simply calls the two claims 
to motherhood a draw and looks to intent to break the tie. This is the 
appropriate outcome of this case, but it is worth considering whether 
the genetic connection merits the priority it is often given.  
 Prioritizing genetics over gestation is another way of prioritizing 
biology over conduct. But the gestational mother is intimately con-
nected to the child in a way that a genetics-only mother (or any fa-
ther) will never be. The gestational mother’s conduct throughout the 
pregnancy has a direct impact on the child’s health and well-being. 
These considerations no doubt play a large part in the law’s discom-
fort with surrogacy. But, to the extent that courts explicitly attribute 
 
 51. 851 P.2d 776 (1993). 
 52. Id. at 778. 
 53. Id. at 782. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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that discomfort to any aspect of surrogacy, they tend to attribute it to 
the fact that the surrogate is giving up a child who is not genetically 
related to her, not the fact that she is giving up a child with whom 
she has shared an intimate prenatal relationship.56 In other words, 
courts tend to emphasize biology (genetics) over conduct (gestation) 
in assigning parental rights.  
 A New York case following Johnson v. Calvert challenges this un-
derstanding. Citing Johnson, McDonald v. McDonald57 held that the 
gestational mother, not the egg donor, was the parent because that 
was the parties’ manifest intent.58 McDonald underscored the fact 
that Johnson avoided the issue of who has the preferred claim to 
motherhood when the gestational mother is not the genetic mother. 
Both cases focused instead on the parties’ manifest intentions, and 
this focus aligns them with traditional contract doctrine.  
 But lower California courts have limited the scope of Johnson v. 
Calvert to cases where there are multiple claims to a biological rela-
tionship, so that biology does not conclusively determine parentage.59 
Where biology is clear (that is, in traditional surrogacy arrangements 
where only one woman has a claim as the “natural” mother), such 
cases hold that it is unnecessary to look to the parties’ intentions to 
determine parenthood. In such cases, biology controls.  
(b)   Traditional Surrogacy 
 Likewise, in the famous case of Baby M.,60 biology helped deter-
mine the outcome. In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
that a traditional surrogacy agreement was unenforceable. In Baby 
M., there was only one biological mother—the surrogate—and she 
challenged the agreement after her child was born. The court refused 
to terminate the surrogate mother’s parental rights without her con-
sent but still granted custody to the intended parents—the biological 
father and his wife—because, the court determined, that was in the 
child’s best interests. This case highlights the distinction in the law 
between using biology to determine parental status while using the 
 
 56. See, e.g., 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF  
CONTRACTS § 16:22 (4th ed. 1999). 
 57. 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994). 
 58. Id. at 480. 
 59. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900 (4th Dist. 1994); see 
also Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 133–36 (Dist. Ct. App. 2004), 
rev’d on other grounds, 37 Cal. 4th. 156 (2005) (citing Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 1231) 
(Johnson does not “endorse contractual stipulations of parentage based on the parties’ in-
tentions without regard to the [California Parentage] Act. In those cases the court looked 
at the parties’ intent as a part of the interpretation and application of the Act. Only when 
the Act was unclear or yielded an ambiguous result did the courts consider intent to de-
termine parentage.”).  
 60. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
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best-interests analysis to make decisions regarding custody.  
 The Baby M. court held that the traditional surrogacy agreement 
violated state statutes regarding surrender of parental rights and the 
state policy of keeping children with their “natural” parents.61 The 
New Jersey statutes governing surrender of parental rights provide 
that parental rights cannot be terminated without either a declara-
tion of parental unfitness or voluntary surrender of the child to a 
state agency.62 In the case of voluntary surrender, the law requires 
formality: the biological parent must give written consent to ensure 
that the surrender is knowing and voluntary and that the biological 
parent has received counseling and is well informed about what she 
is giving up. None of that formality was present in the surrogacy 
agreement at issue in Baby M. But the court was even more concerned 
about the role of money in the contract—the court found a profit mo-
tive in the agreement that was akin to criminal babyselling.63  
 Both of these problematic aspects of the surrogacy agreement—
the lack of formality (which led the court to fear that the agreement 
took advantage of a vulnerable woman not fully informed of her 
rights) and the profit motive (which violated the state’s policy against 
babyselling)—could have been addressed by proper drafting of the 
agreement. Why not require such agreements to include provisions 
that fully inform the surrogate mother of her rights and ban provi-
sions treating the agreement as a commercial transaction (no premi-
ums allowed)? (This seems to have been the way the contract in 
Johnson was written, which may have contributed to the court’s will-
ingness to enforce it.) If the court is willing to operate within the 
framework of contract law, there should be little problem with en-
forcing a surrogacy agreement—particularly one that looks like an 
adoption agreement, which is what the contract just described would 
look like. To be more specific, such an agreement should be enforce-
able so long as it fully informs the biological parent of what is in-
volved in terminating her parental rights, it does not pay a premium 
for termination of rights, and it provides for a window after the baby 
is born during which the parent can change her mind.  
 But the court in Baby M. was not willing to operate within the 
contract framework (perhaps primarily because of the problems with 
the contract in question). The court was also concerned about uphold-
ing New Jersey’s public policy of keeping children with their natural 
 
 61. Id. at 1243. 
 62. See id. (“Our statutes, and the cases interpreting them, leave no doubt that where 
there has been no written surrender to an approved agency or to DYFS, termination of pa-
rental rights will not be granted in this state absent a very strong showing of abandon-
ment or neglect. . . . It is clear that a ‘best interests’ determination is never sufficient to 
terminate parental rights; the statutory criteria must be proved.”). 
 63. See id. at 1240. 
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parents.64 Again, when the question is one of parental status (as op-
posed to custody), the court relies on biology, not conduct or parental 
intent. The court’s explanation for this policy focused on the emo-
tional drama of the case at hand (and the “tug-of-war” between the 
biological parents) without discussing the theoretical underpinnings 
of the law’s preference for biological parents. Indeed, the court’s pri-
mary concern seemed to be the defects in the surrogacy agreement, 
which, as discussed above, are solvable through careful drafting.    
(c)   ”Surrogacy” Without Technology 
 The above cases involved the use of reproductive technology, such 
as in vitro fertilization and artificial insemination. In the absence of 
such technology, courts are even less likely to enforce a surrogacy 
agreement that cuts against a biological relationship with a child. 
For example, Budnick v. Silverman65 held that a contract between a 
“sperm donor” and an infertile couple was unenforceable because the 
sperm was donated “the old-fashioned way,” without the assistance 
of reproductive technology.66 The sperm donor was allowed to assert 
his parental rights despite the existence of a preconception agree-
ment signing away those rights.67 Still, it is important to note that 
biology does not always carry the day, even when only one parent can 
claim a biological relationship. In N.A.H. v. S.L.S.,68 the wife/mother 
conceived a child out of wedlock and the biological father sued to 
have his paternity established.69 Rather than rule conclusively that fa-
therhood is determined either by biology or by a marital relationship 
with the mother, the appellate court remanded with instructions that a 
best-interests-of-the-child analysis should determine legal paternity.70  
 The uncertainty in surrogacy law (and, in particular, its tendency 
to rely on biology in assigning parental status) creates unfair distinc-
tions among parents. Only couples who can afford in vitro fertiliza-
tion of their own embryo in a gestational surrogate’s womb have a 
 
 64. See id. at 1246–47 (“The surrogacy contract guarantees permanent separation of 
the child from one of its natural parents. Our policy, however, has long been that to the extent 
possible, children should remain with and be brought up by both of their natural parents.”). 
 65. 805 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). 
 66. Id. at 1114. 
 67. Id. 
Florida courts have held that agreements relieving a parent of the duty to sup-
port are void as against public policy. . . . The rights of support and meaningful 
relationship belong to the child, not the parent; therefore, neither parent can 
bargain away those rights. . . .  
 . . . The total abdication of parental responsibility present in the instant Pre-
conception Agreement cannot be said to protect the best interests of the child. 
Id. at 113–14. 
 68. 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000). 
 69. Id. at 357-58. 
 70. See id. at 362. 
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(relatively) good chance of having their surrogacy agreements en-
forced. Those who can only afford traditional surrogacy and couples 
where one member is sterile likely will not receive the same protec-
tion for their agreements.  
 This distinction works the greatest unfairness among gay cou-
ples—gay men, in particular. Whereas lesbian couples potentially 
can have the egg of one (fertilized by the sperm of an anonymous do-
nor) implanted in the womb of the other, such that both women have 
a biological claim to parenthood, gay men must rely on a third party 
to carry their child. Even if they use an anonymous egg donor, so 
that the gestational mother cannot claim a genetic relationship, 
courts likely will grant parental rights to that gestational mother if 
she reneges on a surrogacy agreement.71 Her rights as a gestational 
mother, though perhaps deemed inferior (or at best equal) to the 
rights of a genetic mother, will trump the rights of intended parents 
with no biological connection at all.   
D.   Private Ordering of Family Relationships 
 When unmarried couples use contract to attempt to create family 
ties that are as tight as those created by marriage, courts tend to 
leave objective contract theory and engage in substantive review of 
contract terms, with widely varying outcomes. Whether considering 
an implied contract for parental rights between same-sex partners, 
an equitable claim to such rights by the nonbiological parent in a 
custody dispute, or an express agreement between partners, courts, 
on average, tend to disregard the preconception intent of the parties 
and favor the biological parent. Even where courts nominally follow 
the intent of the parties, they do so only where it is in the best inter-
ests of the child, as determined by the court, thus conflating the rules 
for establishing parental status with those for determining custody. 
1.   Establishing Parental Status by Statute 
 Theoretically, there could be no legal difference between someone 
who establishes parental status by procreating and someone who es-
tablishes parental status by contract, where all else between them is 
the same. This is controversial. Many argue that nonbiological par-
ents are incapable of the same attachments that biological parents 
 
 71. See, e.g., J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 22–24 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2004) (holding a 
gestational surrogacy agreement void as against public policy because it did not provide for 
a legal mother and it allowed the parties to bargain away the children’s custody and sup-
port rights and finding gestational mother to be the legal mother because of her actions as 
a parent); see also Jaycee B. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 701 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding 
where neither intended parent had a biological connection to the child, surrogate mother proba-
bly could have challenged the surrogacy agreement to retain her parental rights).  
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have with their children. But generally speaking, we do not question 
the love that adoptive parents have for their children. And we do not 
question the fact that many biological parents do not intend to be-
come parents or are bad parents. This Article merely attempts to put 
contractual parents on the same footing as biological and adoptive 
parents. It does not intend to denigrate the fierce attachments 
that biological parents have to their children. It does, however, 
argue that nonbiological parents may have the same fierce at-
tachments to their children.  
 But the law treats these parents very differently. Statutorily, the 
law generally recognizes only two kinds of legal parents: natural par-
ents and adoptive parents.72 Biological parents may petition courts to 
establish parentage without a best-interests analysis.73  In other 
words, a biological parent may establish parental status even if it is 
not in the child’s best interests. Adoptive parents, however, are not 
awarded parental status without a searching inquiry into whether 
they would make good parents.74 Furthermore, the revised Uniform 
Parentage Act calls for recognition of gestational surrogacy agree-
ments only and allows for establishment of parental status under 
such agreements where those agreements have been validated by a 
court.75 Many states that recognize surrogacy agreements similarly 
limit the establishment of parental status to intended parents who 
are biologically related to the child.76
 
 72. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1 (1973) (“As used in this Act, ‘parent and child rela-
tionship’ means the legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive 
parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obliga-
tions. It includes the mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship.”). 
Several states have adopted language similar to that of the uniform statute. See, e.g., 750 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1 (West 2006). 
 73. See J.S.A. v. M.H., 797 N.E.2d 705, 708–09 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (finding that the 
court was statutorily prohibited from conducting a best-interests hearing to determine 
whether the adjudication of parentage was in the child’s best interests).  
 74. Compare 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/11 (2006) (providing for a court determination of 
parentage based only on biology), with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.  50/20a (2006) (“The best in-
terests and welfare of the person being adopted shall be of paramount consideration in the 
construction and interpretation of [the Adoption Act].”); see also Steven N. Peskind, Who’s 
Your Daddy?: An Analysis of Illinois’ Law of Parentage and the Meaning of Parenthood, 35 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 811, 815-16 (2004) (“Pervasive notions of children’s interests that perme-
ate the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and the Adoption Act are con-
spicuously absent from statutory provisions that determine who should be afforded the op-
portunity to parent a child.”) (citations omitted).  
 75. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 (amended 2002) (providing for recognition of ges-
tational surrogacy agreements); id. art. 6 (granting standing to maintain a parentage pro-
ceeding to intended parents under a gestational agreement authorized by article 8).  
 76. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/6 (2007). 
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2.   Implied Contracts and Equitable Doctrines: The De Facto 
Parent 
 Some courts have held that nonbiological parents may assert at 
least limited parenting rights by virtue of having acted as a “psycho-
logical parent” or “de facto parent” of the child. De facto parent cases 
invoke equitable and implied-contract theories similar to those first 
recognized in Marvin v. Marvin,77 which held in part that “[i]n the 
absence of an express contract, the courts should inquire into the 
conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demon-
strates an implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint ven-
ture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties.”78 Often 
in de facto parent cases, the nonbiological parent is simply granted 
standing to sue for custody, not full parental status.79 These cases 
seem to fragment what it means to be a parent, granting some rights 
but not full parental status to the nonbiological parent. In some 
sense, then, these cases challenge what it means to be a parent in the 
first place. The same thing arguably happens in a custody dispute 
between biological parents, but there, neither parent has the lack of 
a biological connection acting as a strike against custody. Some 
would argue that parenting is more of an all-or-nothing proposition 
and that splitting up the bundle of parenting rights as though they 
were property rights violates due process.80  
 Where a court does grant parental status to a de facto parent, it 
may fall back on biology to do so. This Part analyzes a variety of de 
facto parent cases—both those that do and do not adopt the doctrine 
of the de facto parent—and then discusses how the de facto parent 
doctrine supports this Article’s argument for enforcing contracts that 
establish parental status. 
                                                                                                                    
 77. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
 78. Id. at 110. 
 79. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Olivia J., 84 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1152 (Ct. App. 
2000) (holding that the former same-sex partner of a biological mother could file a petition 
for guardianship of the mother’s child); In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that a former same-sex partner had standing, as a psychological parent, to peti-
tion for equal parenting time after the relationship ended, even though the former partner 
had no legal relationship to the child or the mother); King v. S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965 (Ind. 
2005) (holding former same-sex partner not necessarily precluded from being awarded pa-
rental rights and responsibilities with respect to the biological mother’s child, conceived 
through artificial insemination during the parties’ domestic relationship); Gestl v. Freder-
ick, 754 A.2d 1087 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (finding that the biological mother’s former 
same-sex partner had standing to bring a custody suit under the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act because she held herself out to others as the child’s parent); C.E.W. v. 
D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004) (holding that the former partner of a biological mother 
was entitled to be considered for an award of parental rights and responsibilities where the 
trial court found that she was the child’s de facto parent).
 80. See generally Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 662–63 (2002) 
(discussing parental rights and the Due Process Clause). 
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 An unusually pertinent example of the de facto parent doctrine is 
in K.M. v. E.G.81 There, the California Supreme Court recognized 
that two women who had formerly been a lesbian couple—one of 
whom donated her ova to be fertilized and implanted into the womb 
of the other—were the parents of twins born to them.82 The women 
disputed what they had agreed upon regarding parental rights prior 
to conceiving the twins.83 E.G., the gestational mother, claimed they 
agreed that she would be the sole parent and that she had only 
agreed to be implanted with K.M.’s ova on the condition that K.M. re-
linquish her parental rights.84 An ova donor consent form signed by 
K.M., which explicitly stated she was relinquishing all rights in any 
child conceived, supports this view.85 K.M., on the other hand, 
claimed they agreed to raise the children together and that she only 
read the donor consent form minutes before signing it (and only 
signed it because she thought it was a formality required before do-
nating her eggs).86 The couple’s later conduct—they lived together 
with the children, and both women supported the children87—
supports this view.  
 In reaching its decision that both women were parents, the court 
relied on Johnson v. Calvert, the in vitro fertilization case discussed 
above,88 and on provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act regarding 
presumptions of paternity. The court concluded that “ ‘genetic con-
sanguinity’ could be the basis for a finding of maternity just as it is 
for paternity.”89 Thus, the court relied in part on the biological rela-
tionship between K.M. (the ova donor) and the children and in part 
on the parties’ conduct after the twins were born, treating this con-
duct as a sort of implied intent. There was considerable evidence that 
K.M., the genetic mother, had acted for years as a de facto parent, al-
though neither of the women revealed to family and friends that she 
was genetically related to them.90
 Before the twins were born, some friends held a baby shower 
honoring both E.G. and K.M. After the birth, E.G. and K.M., as a 
couple, received other congratulatory cards and gifts. But E.G. 
never revealed to her friends or family that K.M. was the egg do-
nor. Nor did K.M. disclose that she was genetically related to the 
                                                                                                                    
 81. 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005). 
 82. Id. at 680–81. 
 83. Id. at 679. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. at 676. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. at 676–77. 
 88. See infra Part I.C.2.a. 
 89. K.M., 117 P.3d at 678 (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781–82 (1993)). 
 90. See K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 141–42 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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children, even though the children came to refer to K.M.’s parents 
as “Granny” and “Papa.” 
 . . . E.G. listed K.M. as a “co-parent” on the school enrollment 
forms. However, it was E.G. who signed the enrollment forms and 
paid the preschool tuition. Both E.G. and K.M. took the children to 
pediatric appointments. However, they never revealed to the chil-
dren’s pediatrician that K.M. was genetically related to the girls.  
 . . . K.M. and E.G. then continued to live together until August 
2001, when E.G. moved with the girls to Massachusetts. E.G. 
listed K.M. as a parent on the Massachusetts school forms. K.M. 
and E.G. each paid half the tuition for the Massachusetts school.91
 The court distinguished this case from the true egg donation case 
where the donor is not known by the intended parents and has no 
later relationship to the child.92 The reasoning here seems to be, if it 
looks like a family and acts like a family, we’re going to treat it as a 
family. Of course, this reasoning ignores whether K.M. and E.G. sub-
jectively wanted to be a family. But, from a contracts point of view, 
that might be justifiable: the facts regarding intent were in dispute, 
so the court looked to the objective manifestation of intent, namely 
that K.M. and E.G. were raising the children in their home as par-
ents. That, coupled with K.M.’s genetic relationship to the children, 
was enough to call her a parent. Of course, this objective manifesta-
tion of intent assumes there is general agreement on what counts as 
a family, which is admittedly a big assumption. In both K.M. and 
Johnson, the courts seem driven to create family units with two par-
ents. Johnson looked to the parties’ intent to create a family com-
posed of a married couple and a baby; K.M. looked to biology and the 
conduct of the parties to create a family composed of two mothers and 
their babies. E.G. might argue that it’s unnecessary for children to 
have two parents, if that’s not what the parties wanted in the first 
place. But K.M. might respond that E.G.’s conduct suggests otherwise.  
 From a strictly contractarian perspective, it may be impossible for 
a court to determine the actual terms of agreement or even whether 
there was a meeting of the minds at all, when facts are as heavily 
disputed as they are in K.M. Indeed, K.M. reversed a decision by the 
California Court of Appeal, which had ruled in favor of the gesta-
tional mother. The lower court had based its decision on the ova do-
nor consent form K.M. had signed, relinquishing her parental rights 
to the twins. The lower court’s decision prioritized the ova donor 
                                                                                                                    
 91. Id. 
 92. K.M., 117 P.3d at 679 (“Thus, even accepting as true E.G.’s version of the facts 
(which the superior court did), the present case, like Johnson, does not present a ‘true “egg 
donation” ’ situation. K.M. did not intend to simply donate her ova to E.G., but rather pro-
vided her ova to her lesbian partner with whom she was living so that E.G. could give birth 
to a child that would be raised in their joint home.”) (quoting Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782). 
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form—an express agreement—over the implied agreement between 
the couple to raise the children together. The supreme court’s opinion 
represents the better view. The terms of the ova donor form were 
ambiguous as applied to these parties, because K.M. was not an 
anonymous donor. The later conduct between the parties spoke more 
strongly of an implied agreement to be parents. 
 In Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R.,93 the court rejected an ex-
press parenting agreement between the parties but established par-
enting rights in the nonbiological parent anyway based on the pre-
sumed parent doctrine (which is equivalent to the de facto parent 
doctrine).94 The presumed parent doctrine, codified in the California 
Family Code,95 was drafted to address issues of uncertain paternity—
its purpose was to establish paternity in one who takes a child into 
his home and openly holds out the child as his own. Cases like 
Kristine Renee H. have held that the presumption applies to women 
as well as men, based on a gender-neutral reading of the statute. 
Thus, a presumption that was intended to track biology (much like 
the marital presumption—if you’re holding out a child as your own, 
chances are that child is your own) was extended to cover de facto 
parents, regardless of biology.  
 In rejecting a parenting agreement but finding parental status 
based on the presumed parent doctrine, Kristine Renee H. represents 
a clear preference by the California courts: they prefer to take the 
time to investigate the conduct of the parties rather than to defer to a 
contract between them. Perhaps this represents the wise use of cau-
tion in a new area of law—that regarding reproductive technology. 
But this judicial preference for hands-on decision making can also be 
seen as encroachment: it brings parental status cases involving de 
facto parents within the realm of the best-interests doctrine. As they 
do in custody cases, family courts are imposing their own norms on 
de facto parent cases, rather than leaving things to the parents 
themselves as they tend to do in parentage cases where biological 
parents are involved.  
 In a larger number of cases, however, courts have ignored any im-
plied contract between the parties and declined to invoke equita-
ble doctrines in favor of the nonbiological parent. Often, these 
                                                                                                                    
 93. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123 (Ct. App. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 
2005). Kristine Renee H. is also discussed in Part I.D.3, infra, which addresses judicial ac-
ceptance of express parenting agreements. 
 94. Kristine Renee H. distinguished Johnson v. Calvert (which, you will recall from the 
previous Part, upheld a parenting agreement where biology was ambiguous) in holding 
that, where biology is clear, there can be no resort to a contract for parenting rights. 16 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 133–34; see also supra Part I.C.2. 
 95. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2006). 
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courts find that there is no statutory authority to grant rights to a 
same-sex parent.96   
 For example, in State ex rel D.R.M.,97 the biological mother’s part-
ner left her shortly before she discovered their efforts at artificial in-
semination had been successful. The D.R.M. court held that the ex-
partner was not a parent because she was not biologically related to 
the child and had not adopted the child.98 The court declined to cre-
ate an “intended parent” or “partial parent” who would owe child 
support but not gain any other parental rights.99 This case contrasts 
sharply with K.M. v. E.G. This case also diverges from those in which 
the de facto parent doctrine is used to fragment parenting rights.100 
The court held strictly to the statutory requirements for establishing 
parental status. D.R.M. explained that the outcome would have been 
the same if the ex-partner were a man not married to the mother or a 
stepparent who later divorced the mother.101 The court rejected a 
promissory estoppel claim by the biological mother because it found 
that both parties had understood that for the ex-partner to have any 
rights, the arrangement would have had to proceed to an adoption.102 
The exchange had to be completed on both sides. No adoption meant 
no child support. Furthermore, the court concluded that the biologi-
cal mother would have had the child with or without the ex-partner, 
so there was no reliance.103  
 In T.F. v. B.L.,104 the Massachusetts court held that there was an 
implied contract between the mother and her former domestic part-
ner, but that the contract was unenforceable because 
[t]he decision to become, or not to become, a parent is a personal 
right of “such delicate and intimate character that direct enforce-
ment . . . by any process of the court should never be attempted.” 
“Parenthood by contract” is not the law in Massachusetts, and, to 
 
 96. See, e.g., Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding 
an alleged psychological parent lacked a parental status equivalent to a biological mother 
and was not entitled to custody or visitation over the objection of the biological mother); 
Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-137, 1997 WL 467327, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (affirming 
the dismissal of a nonbiological mother’s complaint for child support and motion for tempo-
rary visitation). But see Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 671–72 (Cal. 2005) (over-
turning Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990) and holding that there is statu-
tory authority under the Uniform Parentage Act to grant rights to a same-sex parent). 
 97. 34 P.3d 887 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
 98. Id. at 891–92. 
 99. Id. at 894. 
 100. See infra notes 79–89 and accompanying text. 
 101. D.R.M., 34 P.2d at 893–94. 
 102. Id. at 897; cf. K.M. v. E.G., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 66 (Ct. App. 2005) (disregarding 
E.G.’s claim that the couple agreed she would be the sole parent unless K.M. eventually 
adopted the children). K.M. may have implicitly granted a promissory estoppel claim to 
parenthood based on the fact that K.M. had treated E.G.’s children as her own for years.  
 103. D.R.M., 34 P.2d at 897. 
 104. 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004). 
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the extent the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an agree-
ment, express or implied, to coparent a child, that agreement 
is unenforceable.105
 The court, emphasizing that the result would have been the same 
if the couple were heterosexual, declined to invoke its equitable pow-
ers to create a duty requiring the former domestic partner to pay 
child support.106 The court, in denying parenthood by contract, ig-
nored the fact that a marriage contract often creates a parenting con-
tract, as discussed in Part I.A.2 of this Article. 
 Likewise, in McGuffin v. Overton,107 a case involving a dispute as 
to the custody of a child whose biological mother had died, the court 
awarded custody to the child’s biological father and held that the 
mother’s same-sex partner lacked standing to seek custody, despite 
the mother’s expressed wishes that the partner be named the child’s 
guardian and the fact that the biological parents were never mar-
ried.108 The mother had executed a will which purported to make her 
partner the guardian of her children.109 The will stated that the 
mother did not want the father named as guardian because he had 
failed to establish a relationship with the children.110 Furthermore, 
at the time of the mother’s death, the father’s support obligation re-
garding the children was approximately $20,000 in arrears.111 In the 
father’s defense, it could be asked why he had been ordered to pay 
child support if he had never developed a relationship with the child 
and had never been married to the mother. Moreover, granting cus-
tody to the mother’s partner without terminating the father’s paren-
tal status would have been constitutionally questionable.112 The court, 
however, stressed that the legislature had been very specific in limit-
ing those third persons who were permitted to bring an action for cus-
tody, and the partner came within none of the statutory classes.113
 This Article’s argument that parties should be allowed to contract 
for parental status draws somewhat on the de facto parent doctrine. 
The de facto parent doctrine is a basic contract doctrine about pro-
tecting expectations and reliance based on implicit private agree-
ments.114 The de facto parent is recognized as a parent because his or 
her conduct manifests an intent to be a parent and that conduct has 
created expectations and reliance on the part of the child and the 
                                                                                                                    
 105. Id. at 1251 (citations omitted). 
 106. Id. at 1252–53. 
 107. 542 N.W.2d 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
 108. Id. at 289–92. 
 109. Id. at 289. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 62–63 (2000).  
 113. McGuffin, 542 N.W.2d at 291–92. 
 114. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
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other parent.115 If courts are willing to grant standing to de facto par-
ents to sue for custody—a right typically reserved to those with par-
enting status established by biology or adoption—then courts should 
also enforce contracts explicitly establishing such status.  
 Of course, the courts that reject the de facto parent doctrine often 
do so precisely because they also do not allow anyone but a biological 
or an adoptive parent to petition for custody.116 These courts do not 
want to create “partial parents,” who may have a right to custody or 
a responsibility to pay support but not full parental rights.117 This 
position makes sense, insofar as it makes parenting an all-or-nothing 
bargain. But it ignores the bargain. Biological and adoptive parents 
engage in bargaining over parental status just as much as non-
biological parents. Biological parents enter a marriage contract be-
fore conception, or else they petition a court to declare parentage.118 
Adoptive parents enter an adoption agreement that terminates 
rights in the birth mother and establishes rights in the adoptive par-
ents, based on specified conditions.  
 As demonstrated by Kristine Renee H., California family courts 
have expressed a preference for the de facto parent doctrine over en-
forcement of explicit parenting agreements. But within the rubric of 
contract law, explicit parenting agreements should be preferred. Ex-
press agreements save the court (and the parties) time and energy. 
Instead of going through the effort (and potentially difficult issues of 
proof) of establishing that someone is a de facto parent, enforcing 
parenting agreements would allow the court to simply refer to a con-
tract, which, if drafted properly, would leave no doubt about who a 
child’s parents are. Furthermore, a policy of enforcing express 
agreements but not implied agreements would create an incentive for 
parents to be clear about their wishes and to draft a formal agree-
ment reflecting those wishes.  
 There is an argument against this proposal: determining parent-
age is tricky business, and courts should not be quick to leave it to 
contract. They should handle these cases carefully and exercise their 
discretion to make thoughtful, individualized decisions. But who does 
that help? It leaves the law indeterminate, and it takes decisions out 
of the hands of those best able to make them—parents. Major corpo-
rations would not be happy to leave the interpretation of their criti-
cal agreements to the ad hoc decision making of a court. Corporations 
 
 115. See id. 
 116. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing D.R.M.). 
 117. See id. 
 118. A court declaration of parentage may be the furthest of these examples from tra-
ditional notions of contract, but a court declaration does establish a form of contractual re-
lations between parents: the right to have a parental relationship with the child is granted 
in exchange for taking on responsibilities for that child. 
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enjoy the benefit of the business judgment rule, which acknowledges 
that directors and officers tend to know best what is in the interest of 
their companies.119 Parents should be no happier to have a court 
make critical decisions regarding their children; at least as to the 
question of parentage, they should be similarly expected to know 
what is in the best interests of their children. Admittedly, when the 
relationship between parents breaks down, often parents are unable 
to reach sensible decisions about custody, and it may be necessary for 
a court to step in and make the best impartial decision it can make. 
But, if those parents have in place an ex ante agreement about their 
status as parents, at least that agreement should be honored in the 
best-interests analysis.   
3.   Express Parenting Agreements 
 Several courts have held that parenting agreements between a le-
gal/biological parent and a nonbiological parent are unenforceable. 
But some courts have enforced such agreements—if the agreement 
was in the child’s best interests. Once again, this conflates the issue of 
parenting status (which should be free from best-interests considera-
tions) with the issue of custody and visitation (which is, for better or 
worse, based on best interests). This Part discusses two cases, one 
where an express agreement was found to be unenforceable, and one 
where such an agreement was enforced.  
(a)   Not Enforceable 
 As discussed in the previous Part, in Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa 
Ann R.,120 the court ruled that it could not accept the parties’ stipula-
tion as a basis for entering a judgment regarding parental status. “A 
determination of parentage cannot rest simply on the parties’ agree-
ment.”121 However, the court found that it could determine parentage 
under the Uniform Parentage Act, so that although resort to contract 
failed, the court’s gender-neutral reading of the relevant statute 
achieved the same goal as enforcement of the parties’ parenting 
agreement would have. “While such a conclusion under the Act may 
not be a result that the Legislature expressly contemplated, the Act 
does mandate that we read the provisions in a gender-neutral man-
ner and that mandate compels our conclusion.”122  
                                                                                                                    
 119. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (“[A] presumption of propriety inures to the benefit of directors.”).  
 120. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123 (App. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005). 
 121. Id. at 126. 
 122. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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(b)   Enforceable 
 Davis v. Kania123 appears to be something of an anomaly in this 
area, at least for the time being. The Connecticut court recognized 
and enforced an agreement establishing two men as the legal parents 
of a child conceived via artificial insemination from the sperm of one 
of the men and the egg of a surrogate.124 Relying on an earlier case, 
the court found that “ ‘the egg donor agreement and the gestational 
carrier agreement [were] valid, enforceable, irrevocable and of full legal 
effect’ under the laws of the state of Connecticut.”125 The court appears 
not to have conditioned enforcement of the contract on a best-interests 
analysis. Instead, it simply enforced the intent of the parties.   
III.   BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
 This Part describes the best-interests standard. It then discusses 
how the standard has operated to deprive gay parents of their paren-
tal rights, both where a gay biological parent is in a dispute with a 
straight parent and where a gay nonbiological parent is in a dispute 
with a gay biological parent. It discusses the different forms the best-
interests standard can take when applied to gay parents, particularly 
the “per se rule” and the “nexus rule,” and it addresses how the best-
interests standard has been used to trump private agreements be-
tween same-sex partners. Finally, this Part discusses the law of sec-
ond-parent adoption, the only sure way for nonbiological parents to 
secure parental rights in the biological children of their partners. 
A.   The Best-Interests Standard 
 The child’s best interests are the primary consideration in custody 
determinations (as opposed to determinations of parental status), 
and judges have broad discretion in determining what those interests 
are.126 There are good reasons for instituting the best-interests doc-
trine: where parents cannot agree, it may be necessary for an impar-
tial judge to make custody and visitation decisions regarding the 
child. Perhaps more important, the best-interests doctrine can be jus-
tified as a protection against third-party harms (the child being the 
 
 123. 836 A.2d 480 (Conn. Super. Ct.  2003). 
 124. Id. at 483. 
 125. Id. (quoting Vogel v. Kirkbride, No. FA 02-024718505, 2002 WL 34119315 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2002)). 
 126. See, e.g., Patrick v. Byerley, 325 S.E.2d 99, 100–01 (Va. 1985) (holding that a 
child’s best interests would be served by his remaining in the care of his stepmother in-
stead of his biological mother and awarding her custody on that basis); see also ROBERT H. 
MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 913 (4th ed. 2000) (noting 
that the best interest of the child is the primary consideration and that judges have broad 
discretion in custody cases). 
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third party) inflicted by parents’ otherwise private decisions.127 But 
in each case it is important to ask, what is the harm prevented? Sec-
ondarily, we must ask whether the best-interests doctrine has the 
potential to cause more harm than it prevents. This Article just 
touches the surface of these questions.128  
 The best-interests standard replaced the “maternal-preference” 
standard for awarding custody in the 1970s.129 It was meant to be a 
neutral replacement for the gender inequalities inherent in the ma-
ternal-preference standard, but the best-interests standard is inde-
terminate and largely standardless. Indeed, the best-interests standard 
is so malleable that at least one commentator has argued, contrary to 
the position taken in this Article, that the best-interests standard is be-
ing used to protect the parenting rights of same-sex parents.130
 The best-interests standard has been adopted by statutes in all 
fifty states.131 The statutes include either lists of relevant factors for 
a judge to consider in deciding what is in the best interests of the 
child or a general directive to courts. A typical example is Alaska’s 
Judgments for Custody Statute.132 The statute states that  
In determining the best interests of the child the court shall con-
sider: 
 (1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs of 
the child;  
 (2) the capability and desire of each parent to meet these needs; 
 (3) the child’s preference if the child is of sufficient age and ca-
pacity to form a preference;  
 (4) the love and affection existing between the child and each 
parent;  
 
 127. Protecting third parties is a bedrock tenet of liberal thought. See JOHN STUART 
MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859) (“The only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized com-
munity against his will is to prevent harm to others.”). 
 128. The “harm” contemplated in this context typically centers around notions of mo-
rality (for example, whether it is moral to enter contracts regarding children and whether 
it is moral to rear children in a household headed by a gay couple) and the fear of the slip-
pery slope (whether marriage and family can survive the kind of expansion contemplated 
by articles like this one). And surely individual liberty must be balanced with—and at 
times give way to—the needs of society, which include the need to impose some public 
“morals” (for example, thou shalt not kill) on individuals. “But it does not follow that every-
thing to which the moral vetoes of accepted morality attach is of equal importance to soci-
ety; nor is there the slightest reason for thinking of morality as a seamless web: one which 
will fall to pieces carrying society with it, unless all its emphatic vetoes are enforced by 
law.” H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 83, 85 (R.M. 
Dworkin ed., 1977). 
 129. Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. 
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 168–69 (1992). 
 130. See Dahlia Lithwick, Family Fuse, SLATE, Mar. 11, 2006, www.slate.com/id/2137879. 
 131. See Theresa E. Ellis, Loved and Lost: Breathing Life into the Rights of Noncusto-
dial Parents, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 276 n.45 (2005). 
 132. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (2004). 
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 (5) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory 
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity;  
 (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and en-
courage a close and continuing relationship between the other par-
ent and the child, except that the court may not consider this will-
ingness and ability if one parent shows that the other parent has 
sexually assaulted or engaged in domestic violence against the 
parent or a child, and that a continuing relationship with the other 
parent will endanger the health or safety of either the parent or 
the child;  
 (7) any evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child ne-
glect in the proposed custodial household or a history of violence 
between the parents;  
 (8) evidence that substance abuse by either parent or other 
members of the household directly affects the emotional or physi-
cal well-being of the child;  
 (9) other factors that the court considers pertinent.133
 The final factor in this list opens the door to consideration of any-
thing the judge deems relevant, including homosexuality. Most indi-
vidual factors (including homosexuality), in most cases, are not per 
se determinative, unless they adversely affect the child.134  
 Potentially complicating matters further, courts often rely heavily 
on the expert testimony of a social worker and/or the report and rec-
ommendation of a guardian ad litem (GAL) in determining the child’s 
best interests.135 The GAL may be an attorney appointed to represent 
the child, in which case he or she would present arguments, not tes-
 
 133. Id. (emphasis added); see also MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 913 n.92 
(citing an empirical study of cases in which judges generally relied on ten major factors 
with forty-three subfactors deemed important in determining children’s best interests). 
 134. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 919, 927, 929–31. 
 135. See, e.g., Beck v. Beck, 207 S.E.2d 378, 380 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974) (allowing the tes-
timony of a social worker notwithstanding the contention of the children’s mother that the 
testimony should have been disallowed because the social worker spent only two hours in 
the home). 
[T]he GAL’s report is based on subjective conclusions, dependent to a great ex-
tent on the quality and training of that individual. In Vermont, GALs are vol-
unteers. There are no specific qualifications necessary for appointment, and 
GAL training is inconsistent among the courts. Their work is performed with-
out supervision, and there is no review of the factors that they consider in rec-
ommending custody. When GALs were surveyed by the Gender Bias Task 
Force about the attitudes they bring to their work, the task force found that (1) 
there is a significant amount of gender bias among the GALs surveyed; (2) in 
custody cases, many GALs are not following applicable law in formulating 
their recommendations and are considering impermissible factors; and (3) 
judges rely heavily upon the recommendations of guardians.  
Gilbert v. Gilbert, 664 A.2d 239, 242 n.2 (Vt. 1995) (citing VT. SUPREME COURT & VT. BAR 
ASS’N, GENDER AND JUSTICE: REPORT OF THE VERMONT TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN 
THE LEGAL SYSTEM, 199–200 (1991); see Patty Nelson, How to Be a Guardian Ad Litem in 
Minor Guardianships, ILLINOIS PRO BONO, July 27, 2006, 
http://www.illinoisprobono.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.dsp_content&contentID=2688.  
2007]                          PARENTING AGREEMENTS 943 
 
                                                                                                                   
timony, to the court. There is considerable confusion and disagree-
ment over the proper role of the attorney GAL.136 Such experts and 
advocates are not subject to the rules of evidence in their investiga-
tions, and they often conduct their investigations on an ex parte ba-
sis.137 The court, however, does retain discretion to disregard the tes-
timony/argument of such witnesses/advocates if it is contradicted by 
that of other witnesses or evidence.138 Still, in cases involving same-
sex parents there is a nontrivial danger that the biases of a child rep-
resentative will lead to a recommendation that the biological parent, 
not his or her same-sex partner, deserves custody of their children. 
B.   A Different Best-Interests Standard for Gay Parents 
 The best-interests standard looks different when it is applied to 
gay parents.139 Three tests have developed in this area: the so-called 
“per se rule,” the “nexus rule,” and a rule shifting the burden of proof 
of fitness to the homosexual parent. The tests were developed in the 
context of determining custody and visitation rights (not parental 
status) between a gay biological parent and a straight biological par-
ent, but, as established in the previous Part, courts often apply the 
best-interests standard in establishing parental status as well. The 
per se rule, which is disappearing from the case law, explicitly as-
sumes a parent’s homosexuality will have a negative effect on a child. 
The nexus rule, though arguably a step in the right direction away 
from the per se rule, implicitly suggests that, if a parent’s homosexu-
ality has any effect on a child, that effect will be negative. The bur-
den-shifting rule also assumes that a parent’s homosexuality will be 
detrimental to a child and forces the gay parent to prove otherwise. 
Thus, even where the gay parent is also the biological parent, the 
best-interests standard has been applied differently depending on 
sexual orientation. 
 
 136. See generally, e.g., Emily Buss, “You’re My What?” The Problem of Children’s Mis-
perceptions of Their Lawyers’ Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699 (1996). 
 137. See, e.g., Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The Improper Expan-
sion of Absolute Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMU L. REV. 
265, 285–86 (2006). 
 138. See, e.g., Fritschler v. Fritschler, 208 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Wis. 1973) (holding that 
the recommendations of a social worker are not mandatory); see also Goodman v. Good-
man,  141 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Neb. 1966) (“Hearsay, opinion, gossip, bias, prejudice, and the 
hopes and fears of social workers should not be the basis for a change of custody” and 
“[f]indings of fact must rest on a preponderance of evidence, the verity of which has been 
carefully and legally tested.”). 
 139. See, e.g., Ex Parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring spe-
cially) (concurring in the denial of custody to a lesbian mother on the ground that 
“[h]omosexual conduct is . . . abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime against nature, and a 
violation of the laws of nature and of nature’s God . . . . It is an inherent evil against which 
children must be protected.”). 
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1.   The Per Se Rule 
 Early custody cases involving gay parents followed a “per se” rule 
against custody “based on the ‘immorality’ of the . . . ‘lifestyle.’ ”140 
The per se rule states that a parent’s homosexual orientation is per 
se detrimental to the child. A seminal case in this area granted cus-
tody to a lesbian mother and her partner, but only on the condition 
that the couple not live together.141 As it is applied today, the per se 
rule does not always make homosexuality an outright bar to custody 
or visitation, as its name implies, but instead counts homosexuality 
as a factor against the gay parent. Although this rule is now followed 
by only a minority of courts,142 courts have followed some form of this 
rule as recently as 2001.143  
2.   The Burden-Shifting Rule 
 A modern manifestation of the per se rule is found in Bowen v. 
Bowen,144 which shifted the burden to the allegedly gay parent to 
prove no adverse impact upon the child from the parent’s homosexu-
ality.145 In that case, the court separated two brothers, awarding cus-
tody of one to the father and of the other to the mother, based on 
the determination that one of the boys would not be able to handle 
the stigma from rumors that his mother was a homosexual. The 
court reasoned: 
Based on what I heard Jeremy has been really hurt by the so-
called rumors. And whether the relationship is true or not true, it’s 
still hurting these children. And I realize that anybody can go out 
 
 140. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 
832 (Found. Press 1997) (citing Bennett v. Clemens, 196 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. 1973)); see Im-
merman v. Immerman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 298, 301 (Ct. App. 1959); Commonwealth ex rel. Bach-
man v. Bradley, 91 A.2d 379, 381–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952). 
 141. See Schuster v. Schuster, 585 P.2d 130, 131, 133 (Wash. 1978). 
 142. See Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Family Law, Am. Bar Ass’n, A White Paper: An 
Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partner-
ships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339, 360 n.68 (2004) [hereinafter White Paper] (listing cases). 
 143. See, e.g., Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (modifying custody in 
favor of the father and declaring a preference for the father’s heterosexual marriage to the 
mother’s same-sex relationship); Taylor v. Taylor, 47 S.W.3d 222, 223, 226 (Ark. 2001) (af-
firming a restriction that allowed a mother custody only if she did not live in a house with 
her same-sex partner or have the partner as an overnight guest). But see Hodson v. Moore, 
464 N.W.2d 699, 700–02 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990), which granted custody to a homosexual 
mother but stated,  
While we do not find a discreet homosexual relationship to be a per se 
bar against a mother’s custody, we do find the behavior of those shar-
ing a custodial parent’s home an important factor in continuing that 
custody and if that behavior can be found to harm the child, the 
child’s interests would require either curtailment of the harmful 
situation or a change of custody. 
 144. 688 So. 2d 1374 (Miss. 1997). 
 145. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 918–19. 
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anywhere and as counsel alluded to the Salem witch trials three 
hundred years ago, people can start rumors on anybody [sic.] And 
it’s a hard thing to overcome once it’s started. And I realize that. 
But in this case I think Linda could have and I think Linda should 
have done something to alleviate those rumors even if it was cut-
ting off her relationship with Lynn.146
3.   The Nexus Rule 
 The “nexus rule,” followed by the majority of courts,147 creates a 
presumption in favor of custody or visitation for the gay parent, re-
buttable by a showing that there is a nexus between the gay parent’s 
lifestyle and harm to the child.148 Courts disagree on the degree of 
harm necessary to remove a child from a gay parent’s custody. Some 
courts hold that the social stigma of living with a gay parent is a suf-
ficient harm, whereas other courts hold that taunting by the child’s 
peers is not enough of a harm to deny custody.149 The cases denying 
custody or visitation based on the nexus rule tend to be older cases.150  
 However, even recent nexus opinions, which are written as though 
they are progressive and, indeed, do have positive results for many 
gay parents, still allow consideration of a parent’s homosexuality 
within the best-interests analysis, despite the fact that numerous 
studies have concluded that homosexuality has no relevant impact on 
parenting abilities.151 These cases suggest implicitly that homosexu-
 
 146. Bowen, 688 So. 2d at 1381. 
 147. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 919. 
 148. See Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (Mass. 1980) (holding that there 
must be a specific showing of harm to the child, exclusive of general cultural prejudice, to 
justify depriving a lesbian or gay parent of custody). 
 149. Compare Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Mass. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that a 
child should be free from taunting by his peers), and S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1980) (accepting as a fact that the mother’s lesbian lifestyle “forces on the child a 
need for secrecy and the isolation imposed by such a secret, thus separating the child from 
his or her peers”), with M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1261–63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1979) (finding that taunting by peers is not enough to deny custody). Consider Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–34 (1984), holding that private biases and the injury they might 
inflict were impermissible considerations under the Equal Protection Clause for denying 
custody to a biological mother who had remarried a man of a different race. 
 150. See, e.g., N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. 1980) (conceding that 
“ ‘[f]undamental rights of parents may not be denied, limited or restricted on the basis of 
sexual orientation, per se’ ” but then removing the child from the lesbian mother’s custody 
because of presumed but undemonstrated harm (quoting appellant)); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 
240, 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (denying a modification of custody sought by a lesbian mother 
despite numerous factors in her favor and against the unaffectionate father because con-
tact with the mother’s lover would “impair the [children’s] emotional development”). 
 151. See Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., No. CV 1999-9881, 2004 WL 
3154530, at *5–7 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2004) (citing studies and medical expert testimony 
that homosexuality has no relevant impact on parenting); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN 
RIGHTS, ADOPTION BY LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEXUAL PARENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT 
LAW 2 (2004), http://www.nclrights.org/publications/pubs/adptn0204.pdf, citing the fol-
lowing studies: Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent 
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ality is a negative factor that could lead to a child’s harm. Damron v. 
Damron152 is an example. There, the appellate court reversed a cus-
tody modification (granting custody to the father) that had been or-
dered because of the mother’s lesbian relationship. The court stated, 
“[o]ther courts generally have recognized that, in the absence of evi-
dence of actual or potential harm to the children, a parent’s homo-
sexual relationship, by itself, is not determinative of custody.”153 Al-
though not as egregious as a per se rule that homosexual parents are 
detrimental to their children, this formulation of the best-interests 
standard still suggests something untoward about homosexuality 
and asserts the state’s right to do something about it.  
 In re Marriage of R.S.154 provides another example. There, too, the 
appellate court reversed a modification of custody to the father based 
on the mother’s homosexuality, stating, “[w]hile a court may consider 
the custodial parent’s homosexual relationship when making a cus-
tody determination, the trial court’s function is limited to determin-
ing the effect of the parent’s conduct upon the children.”155 Again, the 
court suggests that a homosexual relationship will have a negative 
effect. Why else may a court consider a parent’s homosexual relation-
ship in making a custody determination? 
 Even in cases that seem intent on making no distinction between 
gay and straight parents, such distinctions are made. Gay parents 
are subtly discriminated against even when the court seems to think 
it is eschewing that discrimination. For example, in In re Marriage of 
Walsh156 the Iowa Supreme Court removed a restriction on a gay fa-
 
Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 341, 341 (2002), 
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/109/2/341.pdf (“A growing body of scientific 
literature demonstrates that children who grow up with 1 or 2 gay and/or lesbian parents 
fare as well in emotional, cognitive, social, sexual functioning as do children whose parents 
are heterosexual.”); AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING 15 (2005), 
http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbc/publications/lgparenting.pdf (“Not a single study has found 
children of lesbian or gay parents to be disadvantaged in any significant respect relative to 
children of heterosexual parents. Indeed, the evidence to date suggests that home envi-
ronments provided by lesbian or gay parents are as likely as those provided by heterosex-
ual parents to support and enable children’s psychosocial growth.”); Susan Golombok & 
Fiona Tasker, Do Parents Influence the Sexual Orientation of Their Children? Findings 
from a Longitudinal Study of Lesbian Families, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 3, 9 
(1996) (“[T]here is no evidence . . . to suggest that parents have a determining influence on 
the sexual orientation of their children . . . .”); Charlotte Patterson, Lesbian and Gay Par-
enthood, in HANDBOOK OF PARENTING 255 (M.H. Bornstein ed., 1996) (noting that lesbians 
and gay men have proved to be just as committed to the parental role and just as capable 
of being good parents as their heterosexual counterparts). 
 152. 670 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 2003). 
 153. Id. at 875. 
 154. 677 N.E.2d 1297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
 155. Id. at 1300 (citation omitted); see also In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 
2890–91 (Ct. App. 1988) (vacating a restriction on a homosexual father’s visitation rights 
and holding that such a restriction requires a showing of harm).  
 156. 451 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1990).  
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ther’s visitation rights that had limited visitation to times when “ ‘no 
unrelated adult’ ” was present and noted that the father was “a good, 
loving and responsible father to his children.”157 The court adopted 
an almost indignant tone toward the lower court for instituting the 
restriction. “We find no reason for the requirement that Michael’s 
visitations be restricted to times when ‘no unrelated adult’ is present. 
This unusual provision was obviously imposed on account of Mi-
chael’s homosexual lifestyle.”158 Yet in the very next sentence, the 
court reveals its own bias against homosexuality. “Michael argues 
against this restriction and the concern which precipitated it by in-
sisting the children would have no exposure to his lifestyle.”159 In-
stead of ruling that the father’s homosexuality was not to be held as 
a factor against him, the court found that the children would not be 
exposed to his “lifestyle,” thus suggesting that such exposure could 
have a negative impact.160  
 Despite the connotations of the nexus rule, it is a step in the right 
direction. Following a history of depriving gay parents of their rights per 
se, something positive can be seen in courts affirmatively stating that 
gay parents have parenting rights, even if that affirmation is qualified 
with a phrase like “unless the lifestyle causes harm to the child.”  
C.   Best Interests Trump Private Agreements 
 Same-sex parents face even greater hurdles than their biological-
parent partners do when they assert parental rights. It is often un-
clear whether courts are applying a nexus test to same-sex partners 
asserting parental rights, but courts routinely discount their precon-
ception parenting agreements,161 holding that they will be enforced 
only if it is in the best interest of the child.162  These claims of paren-
tal rights generally come up in custody determinations, which ex-
plains why courts are so quick to apply best-interests analysis, but 
that decision operates as a rule favoring the biological parent be-
cause the nonbiological parent never gets an equal shot at establish-
 
 157. Id. at 493. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Again, a preconception parenting agreement would simply be an agreement en-
tered into before the conception of a child, contemplating and intending that conception, 
and, in this case, establishing parenting rights in a nonbiological parent.  
 162. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892–93 (Mass. 1999) (stating that the 
parties’ coparenting agreement was enforceable insofar as it was in the best interests of 
the child and holding that an award was properly made under the court’s equity jurisdic-
tion, since the partner was the child’s de facto parent and visitation would be in the child’s 
best interest); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663–65 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the 
visitation provisions of an agreement between the parties settling the action would be en-
forceable if the provisions were in the child’s best interest).  
948  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:913 
 
                                                                                                                   
ing parental rights in the first place.163 The goal should be, first, to 
establish parental status and, second, to treat contractual parents 
the same as biological or adoptive parents in the best-interests 
custody analysis.  
 The argument for preferring biological parents in determining 
parentage or custody is that biological parents are more invested in a 
child’s well-being than are nonbiological parents. Stepparents offer a 
model here. Evolutionary biologists have argued that stepparents 
and other nonrelatives generally care less than biological parents for 
children living in their homes.164 However, for most same-sex cou-
ples, it is impossible for both members to be biological parents to a 
child. Furthermore, unlike stepparents, the same-sex parents in all 
of the cases discussed here were involved in the decision to conceive 
the child, and, absent biological limitations, would gladly have be-
come a genetic parent. These circumstances make nonbiological par-
ents different from stepparents—even loving stepparents—who may 
or may not intend to play a true parenting role to their spouse’s chil-
dren. 
 The Supreme Court potentially has created still more hurdles for 
same-sex parents by bolstering the rights of biological parents. In 
Troxel v. Granville,165 the Court found that the best-interests stan-
dard carries a presumption that “fit parents act in the best interests 
of their children.”166 Troxel overturned a visitation statute that 
granted visitation to any petitioner (the paternal grandparents in 
this case) if the court determined that the visitation was in the best 
interests of the child. The Court ruled that it was not up to the state 
to make this determination if the child was in the custody of a fit 
parent and held that the statute violated the biological parent’s due 
process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of her children.167   
[T]he decision whether such an intergenerational rela-
tionship would be beneficial in any specific case is for 
the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit 
parent’s decision of the kind at issue here becomes sub-
 
 163. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 922 (listing cases where courts 
“have refused to recognize the claim to visitation rights by a lesbian coparent”).  
 164. See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND 
EVERYDAY LIFE 103 (Vintage Books 1995). 
Substitute parents will generally tend to care less profoundly for children than 
natural parents [with the result that] children reared by people other than 
their natural parents will be more often exploited and otherwise at risk. Paren-
tal investment is a precious resource, and selection must favor those parental 
psyches that do not squander it on nonrelatives. 
MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE (Aldine de Gruyter 1988).  
 165. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 166. Id. at 68. 
 167. Id. at 68–69, 75. 
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ject to judicial review, the court must accord at least 
some special weight to the parent’s own determina-
tion.168   
Thus, although Troxel removes some of the state’s discretion in mak-
ing best-interests determinations, it does so in favor of the biological 
parent, which means that even without judicial bias, nonbiological 
parents seeking parental rights face an uphill battle.  
 Some lower courts have interpreted Troxel as creating a “narrow 
definition of ‘parents’ for the purpose of standing in custody and visi-
tation cases” and have relied on Troxel to deny custody or visitation 
to same-sex partners.169  
D.   Second-Parent Adoption 
 As discussed previously in this Article, states typically recognize 
only two kinds of legal parents: biological and adoptive.170 This Part 
discusses adoption, and in particular, second-parent adoption. Sev-
eral courts have granted requests by lesbian partners to allow the 
nonbiological parent to adopt the biological child of the other part-
ner.171 This kind of adoption is called second-parent adoption, and it 
is distinguished from traditional adoption in that the biological par-
ent retains her parental rights in a second-parent adoption and 
agrees to share those rights with a nonbiological parent.  
 Second-parent adoption provides one solution to the problems de-
scribed throughout this Article. It grants parental status to a non-
biological parent, so that parent has the same rights in a child as are 
possessed by the biological parent. Unlike a parenting agreement be-
tween partners, a judge may not disregard a second-parent adoption, 
not even if that judge thinks disregarding it is in the best interests of 
the child. The best-interests standard still applies to adoptive par-
ents throughout the adoption process and in custody and visitation 
disputes, but once the adoption has taken effect, adoptive parents 
stand on equal footing with biological parents. Thus, just as Troxel 
determined for biological parents, adoptive parents should also re-
 
 168. Id. at 70. 
 169. Sean H. v. Leila H., 783 N.Y.S.2d 785, 788 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (stating that, even be-
fore Troxel, “[t]he Court of Appeals has made it unequivocally clear that biological or legal 
strangers to a child have no standing under these statutes to pursue custody or visita-
tion”). But see Bartholet, supra note 40, at 327 (“Troxel makes it clear that ‘parents’ are 
constitutionally protected against inappropriate intervention in their families by nonpar-
ents, but it does nothing to limit how states may define parents and thus little to limit de-
velopment of the functional parent trend.”). 
 170. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1 (1973). 
 171. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 922 (listing cases); see also 
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-102 cmt. 9 pt. IA (explaining that the provision conferring 
standing on a de facto parent to adopt with a custodial parent’s consent also applies to 
second-parent adoptions). 
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ceive the presumption that they are acting in the best interests of 
their children.172  
 But second-parent adoption is not a cure-all. For one thing, it is 
not legal for homosexuals to adopt children in every state. Florida 
bans adoption by homosexuals outright,173 and other states, such as 
Utah and Mississippi, limit adoption to married couples and couples 
not of the same gender.174 Furthermore, even in the number of states 
where second-parent adoption by homosexuals is legal,175 it may be 
prohibitively expensive for many couples. Of course, the same could 
be said for artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization, both of 
which are relatively expensive.176 Moreover, and perhaps much more 
significant, prior to the issuance of a final adoption decree, the bio-
logical mother may be able to revoke her consent to the adoption for 
any reason, including that she does not want her child to be reared 
by a gay couple.177 Relatedly, courts use the best-interests standard 
 
 172. However, the language of Troxel does admit a possible distinction. The presump-
tion is that “fit” parents act in their children’s best interests. An argument could be made, 
at least in the minority of states still following the “per se” rule, that homosexual parents 
are not “fit.” However, this argument is unlikely to succeed in the context of two gay par-
ents disputing custody or visitation because of its pot-calling-the-kettle-black nature. Fur-
thermore, as the prevalence of the “nexus test” reveals, the trend among most courts is 
away from viewing homosexuality as a negative factor, at least per se.  
 173. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2006) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute 
may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”). Florida’s ban on gay adoption was upheld in 
Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
 174. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (2006) (“A child may not be adopted by a per-
son who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage un-
der the laws of this state. For purposes of this Subsection (3)(b), ‘cohabiting’ means residing 
with another person and being involved in a sexual relationship with that person.”); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2006) (“Adoption by couples of the same gender is prohibited.”). 
 175. See White Paper, supra note 142, at 362 (stating that second-parent adoption is 
available by statute or appellate decision in California, Connecticut, the District of Colum-
bia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont 
and that second-parent adoptions have been granted by trial court judges in counties of 
Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington).  
 176. An attorney who has consulted with J.A. and M. stated that the costs for a second-
parent adoption are roughly $1500. That’s in addition to the $5500 they spent on the artifi-
cial insemination. This is inexpensive compared to an international adoption. See Irena 
Choi Stern, From Russia, Looking for Love, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2004, at 14WC (stating 
that adoption of a Russian child could cost $15,000 or more). But it is far more expensive 
than having a child (and acquiring parenting rights) naturally.  
[I]n the Midwest having a baby with a normal delivery procedure has an aver-
age cost of $10,249, including physician and hospital cost. If you have a health 
plan, it probably has negotiated a payment of only $5,150, of which the patient 
will pay only about $940. Uninsured patients are often charged the full list price.  
Terry Savage, Comparing Costs for Health Care Just Got Easier, MERRILLVILLE POST-
TRIBUNE (Merrillville, Ind.), Oct. 1, 2006, at E2. 
 177. See, e.g., Commonwealth Adoptions International, Inc., Commonly Asked Domes-
tic Adoption Questions, http://www.commonwealthadoption.org/adoption.php?id=USA 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2006) (discussing birth mother’s rights to revoke consent under 
Florida law); LawInfo.com, Adoption and Adoptive Parents Rights FAQ, 
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to determine whether someone is fit to adopt, which introduces rela-
tively standardless decision making into the adoption process, just as 
it exists elsewhere in family law.  
 Beyond these fundamental hurdles, some courts have trouble with 
the concept of second-parent adoption, even where the couple in-
volved is heterosexual. This is because standard adoption procedures 
require the biological parents to relinquish parental rights.178 Sec-
ond-parent adoption modifies the procedure such that one biological 
parent retains parental rights and agrees to share those rights with 
the second parent. Many adoption statutes create second-parent ex-
ceptions for stepparents, but, inasmuch as “stepparents” are by defi-
nition married to a parent, courts sometimes do not allow same-sex 
couples to take advantage of these provisions because they are not 
legally married and therefore not technically stepparents.179 Accord-
ing to one recent overview of the law, second-parent adoption by un-
married couples is allowed in California, Connecticut, the District of 
Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Vermont.180  
 There is another potential barrier to second-parent adoptions: a 
judge may determine that the second-parent adoption decree does 
not confer jurisdiction on the court to rule on disputes concerning 
child custody or support if a same-sex couple breaks up.181 Instead, a 
judge may find that there must be a marriage dissolution or pater-
nity proceeding to confer statutory jurisdiction on the court.182 Nei-
ther of those applies in the case of a same-sex, second-parent adop-
tion. One judge in M. and J.A.’s state solved this problem by finding 
that there is equitable jurisdiction to hear the issues, despite the ab-
 
http://resources.lawinfo.com/index.cfm?action=results1&cat=104&act=faq&keywords=&sta
te=&subcatid=268&i=a (last visited Feb. 27, 2006) (discussing birth mother’s rights to re-
voke consent generally). 
 178. At least four state supreme or appellate courts have held that their adoption stat-
utes do not allow second-parent adoptions. See In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 492–
93 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 383 (Neb. 2002); In re 
Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); In re Angel Lace M., 516 
N.W.2d 678, 682–83 (Wis. 1994).  
 179. See In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 683 n.8 (holding that the stepparent ex-
ception does not apply to same-sex couples even though an adoption by the same-sex part-
ner of the biological parent would be in the child’s best interest). 
 180. NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 151, at 8 (citing state statutes and 
case law on second-parent adoption).  
 181. See Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 2002) (denying summary judgment 
to a biological mother claiming the second-parent adoption decree awarding parental 
status to her partner was invalid under Pennsylvania law and that the Nebraska court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear a custody dispute between the former partners, 
but stating that a foreign judgment—the adoption decree—could be attacked by evidence 
that the rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction).  But see 25 CAUSES OF ACTION 
2d 1 § 8 (2006) (stating that second-parent adoptions do confer standing on second parents 
to sue for custody or visitation). 
 182. See supra note 96. 
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sence of any statutory jurisdiction. “But the problem is the original 
parent of a same sex couple could challenge the legality of the second 
parent adoption and the Court’s exercise of equitable jurisdiction,” 
their lawyer said. “And if the issue went to the Court of Appeals or 
[the] Supreme Court, they could decide that same sex second parent 
adoptions are not authorized in [this state].”183  
IV.   PARENTING BY CONTRACT IN A BEST-INTERESTS WORLD 
 This Part suggests a two-part solution for same-sex parents as-
serting parental rights in the biological children of their partners, 
particularly children conceived with the intention that both partners 
would rear them as their own. It proposes, first, that courts should 
enforce parenting agreements where such agreements are properly 
drafted, just as they enforce adoption agreements, declarations of 
parentage, and parentage established by a marriage contract. Sec-
ond, contractual parents should be treated the same as other legal 
parents in a best-interests analysis. This part of the proposal is es-
sentially a restatement of the first part, but it highlights the distinc-
tion between establishing parental status on the one hand and de-
termining custody based on a best-interests analysis on the other. 
This Article argues that once a contractual parent has established 
legal parental status, there should be no discretion within the best-
interests analysis to prefer the biological parent as such. 
A.   Contract-Only Proposals 
 This Article’s proposal differs from other proposals that argue for 
strict enforcement of nonmarital family contracts. Such arguments 
tend to focus on the rights of the parents without wrestling with the 
problems presented by the best interests doctrine and the state’s 
compelling interest in the welfare of its children. For example, Mar-
tha Ertman has written that business contracts are a useful model 
for marriage, cohabitation, and polyamory because the flexibility of 
the business contract better accommodates the wide variety of family 
relationships that exist today than does the traditional marriage con-
tract.184 Ertman also argues that recognizing business-like family 
contracts would help eradicate inequality by getting rid of the “race, 
sex, gender, sexual orientation, and class hierarchies” created by 
what she calls the “naturalized model of family.”185  
 Ertman concludes that the benefits of privatization outweigh the 
drawbacks, but she does not address the state’s interest in maintain-
 
 183. E-mail from J.A. to author (May 6, 2005, 13:21:47 CST) (on file with author).  
 184. Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinc-
tion, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 82, 100 (2001). 
 185. Id. at 80–81. 
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ing the well-being of children, which is potentially a large drawback. 
The state’s interest in its children potentially conflicts with the 
private interest in enforcement of a business-like contract regard-
ing parental rights. 
 Other scholars, such as Kathy Baker, agree that strict enforce-
ment of parenting contracts is unrealistic.  
 The idea that courts would use simple objective theories of con-
tract interpretation when children’s existence and ultimate care 
are at stake is rather simplistic. . . . The sheer novelty of contracts 
in the reproductive technology area makes it likely that courts will 
need to struggle with objective interpretation. There are no com-
monly understood conventions. In addition, the courts’ and the 
parties’ lack of familiarity with the technology make it important 
for courts to scrutinize the contracts particularly carefully. . . . It is 
implausible and arguably inappropriate to think that at this nas-
cent stage of technological baby-making, a court would enforce a 
surrogacy contract with the facility and efficiency with which it en-
forces a contract for the sale of widgets.186
Yet, compared to the substantive review courts apply to parenting 
contracts between same-sex partners—and the ease with which 
courts disregard such contracts—surrogacy agreements almost are 
enforced “with the facility and efficiency with which [courts enforce] 
a contract for the sale of widgets,” particularly when the surrogacy 
agreement involves a heterosexual married couple contracting with a 
gestational surrogate (so that the intended parents are genetically 
related to the child—their embryo is implanted in the gestational 
surrogate’s womb).187  
 Perhaps Baker’s assessment illustrates that, in the realm of con-
tract enforcement, there is a spectrum of scrutiny granted by courts 
(something akin to the tiers of scrutiny in constitutional law), based 
on how controversial, or perhaps how personal or intimate, the terms 
of the contract are, or how “nascent” the technology involved is. If 
that is the case, it appears that the spectrum shifts according to con-
temporary norms (surrogacy agreements are more readily enforced 
today than they were in the 1980s, for example). And all that can be 
said of enforcement of parenting agreements is that, today, they are 
on the far end of the spectrum from agreements concerning the sale 
of widgets. And surrogacy agreements are somewhere in the middle. 
As for the de facto parent doctrine, courts prefer to take a hands-on 
approach there as well. Courts will investigate the conduct of the 
 
 186. Baker, supra note 9, at 30. 
 187. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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parties to determine whether someone is a de facto parent rather 
than take a contractarian approach.188
B.   This Article’s Proposal: Contract Within Best Interests 
 This Article’s proposal incorporates recognition of parenting 
agreements into the best-interests doctrine. In practice, this would 
require a court to treat a contractual parent the same as a biological 
parent in the best-interests inquiry. The court would have no discre-
tion to disregard a valid parenting agreement or to prefer a biological 
parent on the basis of biology alone. The contractual parent would 
have the same legal status as the biological parent.  
 By way of illustration, as the law exists today, a same-sex couple 
like M. and J.A. might hire a lawyer to help them write a contract es-
tablishing the same parental rights in M. that J.A. has by virtue of 
being the biological parent. They might have nothing but the child’s 
best interests in mind; and in fact, the arrangement might be in the 
child’s best interests (because, for example, it would establish a fam-
ily unit with two legal parents, and the child would not have to worry 
that M. would someday be cut out of his life if M. and J.A. broke up). 
However, as the law stands today, a court charged with determining 
the child’s best interests need not even read that contract. Some fam-
ily courts may even find that they lack subject-matter jurisdiction to 
interpret such contracts because they do not form a part of a divorce 
decree or separation agreement.189 In the event of a separation, the 
court may decide to grant full custody to J.A. for any number of rea-
sons. As a nonparent, M. may not even be granted standing to chal-
lenge the court’s order.  
 Under this Article’s approach, however, the court would have to 
treat M. as an equal legal parent with J.A. This approach could be 
implemented by a variety of procedural devices. A simple way to im-
plement it would be to develop a form contract that clearly and thor-
oughly informed the parties of their rights and what rights they were 
waiving. The form contract would state who was establishing paren-
tal rights and who (if anyone) was terminating parental rights. It 
would also provide a window of time during which the parties could 
change their minds (perhaps with a stipulated damages provision for 
any parties with sunk costs). Finally, a requirement that the form 
contract be filed with the state could serve a record-notice function 
similar to that of a marriage certificate or birth certificate. 
 
 188. See supra note 42. 
 189. See Steven R.J. v. Nancy J., 459 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (Fam. Ct. 1983) (“Where as here 
[the parties’] ‘contract’ contains provisions beyond determining the issues of custody/visitation, 
Family Court lacks the requisite equitable jurisdiction to reform or modify them.”).  
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 In cases where a written parenting contract conflicts with the 
later, manifest intent of the parties (determined by their behavior 
toward each other or the child), standard contract rules could ap-
ply.190 For example, if the parties enter into a parenting contract and 
later their intent changes such that both parties agree that one of 
them should no longer have custody of the child, the couple could be 
allowed to modify the contract to reflect their changed circumstances. 
At the same time, if one party decides to avoid the contract unilater-
ally, the other party should be allowed to sue for breach, as well as 
for support of the child. Allowing parties to contract away their pa-
rental rights is controversial, but parents avoid their parental obliga-
tions all the time, generally without the agreement of both parties. In 
the rare case where both parties agree to the modification, their re-
negotiated contract should be honored, at least in regard to custody, 
if not parental status. In the more common case where a parent uni-
laterally breaches, the legal consequences—a suit for breach or a suit 
for child support—are not that different. A less controversial ap-
proach would be simply to apply family law principles to disputes in-
volving contractual parents. Where a contractual parent abandons a 
child, for example, the child or the parent should have a cause of ac-
tion for support. Likewise, family courts should grant jurisdiction to 
hear contractual parents’ custody and visitation disputes.   
 However implemented, this approach sends the message to all 
parents that enforcing the parents’ private wishes is in the best in-
terests of the child. This claim is based on the assumption that most 
parents—biological or not—want what is best for their children.191 
 
 190. Different factual scenarios will create harder and easier cases. An easy case is one 
where the parents enter into a contract and their later behavior coincides with the terms of 
the contract. A hard case is one where the parties enter into a contract, but one of them 
does not realize the scope of the contract and the later behavior of both parties conflicts 
with that contract. This is similar to what happened in K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 
2005). See supra Part I.D.1. The lower court enforced an ova donor form contract that con-
flicted with the conduct (or “intent”) of the parties. Id. at 677–78. The California Supreme 
Court reversed, finding that the intent of the parties, based on their conduct, controlled, 
enforcing a sort of implied parenting contract. Id. at 679–82. This is perhaps the most diffi-
cult case because it requires delving into the subjective intent of two people whose rela-
tionship has since ended. 
 191. This is an empirical claim not proven here, but it can be assumed, perhaps opti-
mistically, to be true. However, the literature on evolutionary biology suggests the con-
trary. See WRIGHT, supra note 164, at 103 (arguing that stepparents care less for their 
children than biological parents for reasons relating to evolutionary fitness). Even if non-
biological parents’ private wishes regarding parenting generally do not coincide with the 
best interests of their children, it seems plausible that if the law treated parents as if that 
were the case, it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. An analogy to this can be found in 
parenting: Parents who treat their children with respect and trust raise children who can 
be respected and trusted. Parents who do not expect much of their children tend to raise 
children who do not expect much of themselves.  
 It bears noting, too, that in the same-sex parenting agreements discussed here, one party 
is always a biological parent. Inasmuch as courts do defer to biological parents’ wishes, 
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Enforcing parenting contracts rewards the couple for taking the time 
to think through how they want to rear their children and then put-
ting those wishes into contractual terms. It rewards thoughtful, for-
mal, family decision making, and it supports those decisions even if 
they do not fit the status quo. This approach places the responsibility 
for those contractual terms where it belongs: on the parents who en-
tered into them.192
 This would change the analysis in many cases. To give just one 
example, in a case like Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R.,193 where the 
court refused to consider the parenting agreement but granted par-
enting rights under the presumed parent doctrine, this Article’s ap-
proach would simplify the court’s inquiry because it would allow ref-
erence to the contract to determine parentage. The court could then 
go straight to the best-interests inquiry without an investigation into 
whether the contractual parent was, in fact, a legal parent with 
standing to petition for custody. Limiting parents to those who have 
entered a formal agreement with the biological parent avoids the 
Troxel problem of allowing just any third party to petition for visita-
tion and custody.  
 Even if courts are leery of honoring the intent of nonbiological 
parents, they should at least follow the intent of the biological parent 
who has signed onto a parenting agreement with his or her partner. 
The Supreme Court supports this view. Troxel held that the best-
interests standard carries “a presumption that fit parents act in the 
best interests of their children.”194 A fit parent who has entered a 
parenting agreement with his or her partner should be presumed to 
have done so in the child’s best interests.  
 Furthermore, some courts have gone the step further recom-
mended by this Article and enforced private agreements without ref-
erence to best interests. Davis v. Kania195 is an example, albeit in the 
minority, in the context of same-sex parents. This proposal differs 
                                                                                                                    
they should also defer to the nonbiological parents’ wishes where those wishes are the 
same as the biological parents’ and are memorialized in a contract.   
 192. Granting custody to the biological parent without consideration of the parties’ in-
tent, on the contrary, lets the nonbiological parent out of the deal after the relationship has 
turned sour. Generally, in these cases, this is the parent fighting for parental rights, but it 
could work the other way too. The nonbiological parent may be the stereotypical “deadbeat 
dad.” Without court enforcement of a parenting contract, the child is left with only one 
parent—a parent who might not have had that child if she knew the other parent would be 
relieved of parenting duties at a judge’s discretion. This may be deemed acceptable if both 
parents know there is a strong possibility their contract will not be enforced and decide to 
have a child anyway, but if they enter a parenting contract expecting it to be binding, it is 
unfair to the child and the custodial parent, if not also to the noncustodial parent, not to 
enforce it.  
 193. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123 (Ct. App. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005). 
 194. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000). 
 195. 836 A.2d 480 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003); see also supra Part I.D.2.b. 
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from what many courts have been doing already, which is enforcing 
private agreements if they are in the child’s best interests. This pro-
posal would separate the inquiry. It would first allow parents to es-
tablish parental status by contract. Second, it would treat contractual 
parents the same as biological or adoptive parents in any subsequent 
best-interests analysis.  
 Finally, this solution sends the message to parents that parents—
biological or not—presumptively act in their children’s best interests, 
and it is generally not the place of courts to disturb their wishes, par-
ticularly where they have taken the time and effort to memorialize 
those wishes in contract. With that freedom comes responsibility for 
the children contemplated in the parenting agreement. Courts should 
presume to enforce such contracts, both to protect the rights of the 
nonbiological parent and to cement the responsibilities of that non-
biological parent to the child. This should be the right of all children 
with unmarried parents.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 In time, same-sex couples likely will gain the right to marry and, 
with it, the rights that accompany parenting a child. At that future 
date, it may no longer seem necessary to protect those rights by con-
tract.196 But that future date may be a long way off. As noted at the 
beginning of this Article, states are increasingly banning gay mar-
riage by constitutional amendment and state statute. Waiting 
around for someday could guarantee that that day comes later rather 
than sooner. Children grow up quickly. They could use the stability 
and certainty of two legal parents in the meantime. 
 
 
 196. However, as stated throughout, neither gay nor straight couples should be forced 
to marry to acquire parenting rights. Should they decide to contract for those rights in-
stead of getting married—for whatever reason—their parenting contracts should be en-
forceable. I only point out that, as same-sex marriage eventually enters the mainstream, 
the need for parenting contracts may not seem quite as pressing because such contracts 
will no longer be the only way to establish parental rights. 
